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ABSTRACT
Increasingly, many philosophers of science agree that an account of representation
in science must include an irreducible reference to the intentions, actions, and agency of a
scientist. Though these pragmatic accounts of scientific representation have numerous
advantages over alternatives, very little has been said about the reference to agency found
within. My dissertation uses work from the philosophy of action to fill in some of the
missing details, offering a better foundation and more complete picture of the nature of
representation in science. I begin with an overview of the literature in an encyclopedia
article. I then argue for the communal nature of representation in science, suggesting that
we cannot understand scientific representation without first understanding how scientists
license representational vehicles to be used for particular purposes. Next, I argue that an
account of scientific representation reduced to mental states is mistaken precisely because
it leaves out the communal element of licensing. The following paper offers the first ever
account of the nature of scientific, representational actions. The Means-End Account of
Scientific, Representational Actions relies on the work on the nature of intentional actions
of G.E.M. Anscombe and suggests that representational actions in science can be
demarcated from other forms of action in virtue of features that hold of their internal form.
Relying on a similar point about the relationship between pragmatic accounts of scientific
representation and the nature of intentional action, my fourth paper argues that the many
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are complementary with one another and
allow a more complete understanding of scientific representation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION AND HUMAN
ACTION
1. Introduction
If you were to enter a science department on any given university or accompany scientists
as they collect data in the field, there are several things you would observe. Aside from
measurement tools, notebooks for data collection, and some subject or phenomenon under
investigation, you would observe a group of scientists performing actions: experimenting,
theorizing, and, as I shall explore in this dissertation, representing. My work in this
dissertation argues for, explores, and advances the view that representation in science exists
in virtue of the activities of scientists. This view—the pragmatic view of scientific
representation—has increased in popularity in recent years and has been defended in a few
variations by a number of philosophers of science (e.g., Hughes 1997; Bailer-Jones 2003;
Suárez 2004; Van Fraassen 2008; Giere 2004, 2010).
A natural way forward from the important work already conducted by these
philosophers is to explore in greater detail the relationship between scientific representation
and human activity. The task I take up in this dissertation is to begin this exploration,
examining the relationships that hold between scientific representation and human action
by drawing connections to the literature from analytic action theory. My work in this
dissertation helps to show how it is that the relationship of representation is grounded in
human action embedded in a practice. The substantive chapters of the dissertation thus
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make a useful contribution to the pragmatic perspective of scientific representation, by
further developing and explaining the nature and role of actions within scientific
representation. Apart from developing and defending an original analysis of the nature of
scientific, representational actions (chapter 4), I also argue that the scientific community
plays an irreducible role in the representational relationship (chapter 3) and offer an
argument which uses the common groundwork among pragmatic accounts of scientific
representation to show that they are complementary with one another (chapter 5). Before
explaining these arguments in greater detail, I will briefly examine the background from
both philosophy of science and philosophy of action.
1. Background
2.1 Philosophy of Science Background
Painting with broad strokes, we can trace some of the developments that lead to
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, paving the way for the insights coming
from action theory to be applied to scientific representation. Early accounts of scientific
representation were ‘substantive’ insofar as they offered an account of scientific
representation in terms of the features which held between the vehicle (e.g. a model) and
its target (e.g. a real-world system). These accounts, at least as they have been commonly
interpreted, are “dyadic,” (Knuuttila 2005, 1261) since they conceive of representation as
a two-place relationship. The two main versions of substantive accounts are similaritybased and structuralist accounts.
Structuralist accounts explain the relationship between representational vehicle and
its target in terms of shared structure between the vehicle and target, described in terms of
a functional mapping relationship. For example, one common structuralist account says
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that the representational relationship between a vehicle and its target holds in virtue of an
isomorphic relationship, namely the fact that we can draw a bijective (one-to-one and onto)
function between the structure of the vehicle and the structure of the target. Such a view is
most famously attributed to Bas van Fraassen (1980).1 Of course, an account of
representation as isomorphism

faces certain problems, especially related to

misrepresentation which is itself a common practice within science. As such, most
philosophers interested in defending a structuralist account offer instead an account of
partial isomorphism (e.g., French and Ladyman 1999; French 2003; Bueno and French
2011). The important distinction offered by accounts of partial isomorphism is that they
leave room for misrepresentation and non-representational features of a vehicle and its
target, since they do not require that every element of the structure be included in the
isomorphism.
The second major type of substantive account of scientific representation says that
the representational relationship between a vehicle and its target holds in virtue of some
form of similarity. Similarity is a relationship which is “a weaker interpretation of the
relationship between model and real system” than structural (partial) isomorphism, insofar
as it incorporates isomorphism while also leaving room for additional forms of similarity
(Giere 1988, 81). The most famous defender of a similarity account is Ronald Giere, who
argues that appealing to similarity to explain representation requires an “implicit” (or
perhaps in some cases explicit) “specification of relevant respects and degrees” (1988, 81).

1

Though as he and Mauricio Suárez (Ladyman et al. 2011) point out, a purely dyadic interpretation of van
Fraassen’s understanding of scientific representation in his 1980 book constitutes at least a partial
misinterpretation of his view, since his account leaves room for the agent. Nonetheless, the dyadic view of
his account of representation, as it was commonly interpreted, was rather influential.
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He means that when we rely on similarity to explain a representational relationship, we are
not invoking just any similarities that happen to hold between vehicle and target, but rather
specific similarities—taken in some respect, some vehicle is N-degree similar to its target.2
Recently, philosophers of science have (for the most part) begun to move away
from substantive accounts of scientific representation in favor of pragmatic accounts of
scientific representation. A major part of this movement seems to be due to a set of
influential arguments against similarity and isomorphism presented and defended by
Suárez (2003) among others (e.g. (Frigg 2006). Among the worries he raises are some
which follow the work of Nelson Goodman (1976) by arguing that there is a mismatch
between the formal properties of representation on the one hand and similarity or
isomorphism on the other. Representation is commonly understood to be non-symmetric,
non-reflexive, and non-transitive. Isomorphism has the opposite qualities for each of these:
it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. Similarity does share non-transitivity with
representation, but differs insofar as it is reflexive and symmetric. There is an essential,
logical mismatch between the relationships of similarity and isomorphism on the one hand
and representation on the other. As such, both are inadequate with regard to explaining the
nature of representation in science.
Increasingly, and in light of these objections to substantive accounts, many
philosophers of science agree that if we are to understand the nature of representation in
science, we must analyze it as a particular sort of activity—as an activity carried out by
agents working within a broader community, for the sake of particular aims and goals. Put

The need to invoke similarities demonstrates, as Suárez suggested, that Giere’s account also left room for
the role of an agent, even if it was not interpreted that way (Ladyman et al. 2011).
2
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otherwise, we must add another member to the relationship of scientific representation and
offer “(at least) triadic” accounts of scientific representation (Knuuttila 2005, 1261). On
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, the relationship holds not only between the
vehicle and its target, but also between the user of the vehicle—where the user can be
understood as an individual scientist, a group of scientists, or the scientific community in
general.
Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, now quite numerous, offer
significant insights into the nature of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Teller 2001;
Bailer-Jones 2003; Suárez 2004, 2010, 2015a, Giere 2004, 2010; Contessa 2007; Van
Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009; Frisch 2014). The details vary from account to account, but the
unifying feature of these accounts is an irreducible place for agency: a vehicle represents
its target because a scientist or group of scientists uses it that way. However, despite the
insights offered by these accounts and their value in being better able to explain the
heterogeneity of representational practice in science, there remains important work to be
done on this approach to the issue of representation in science—including, as I will explore
in this dissertation, on the nature of the human agency which undergirds representation in
science.
While pragmatic accounts have made good use of the notions of action, agency,
intention, and use, they have for the most part left these terms unanalyzed and unexplained.
Given their importance for the pragmatic account of representational relationship (the
scientist’s action of using the representation is one of the three members of the ‘triadic’
account of representation), further analysis of scientific actions stands to deepen and
advance a pragmatic approach to representation in science. It is for this reason that my
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dissertation turns to insights about the nature of human action drawn from the literature in
analytic philosophy of action.
2.2 Philosophy of Action Background
Of course, there are a wide range of views and insights to be found within action
theory. In order to draw insights, it is important to first narrow down the list of potential
sources of insights in action theory by referring to ideas about the relevant form of agency
found within pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. While very little has been
said about what is meant by agency, there are two guiding points that I take. The two points,
one negative and the other positive, are each related to the relationship between scientific
representation and individual mental states.
First is the negative claim that scientific representation cannot be explained only
through reference to individual mental states. Suárez, for example, is explicit in making
this negative claim when he denies the view that “representation is necessarily the property
of individuals: representation is ‘in the head’” (Ladyman et al. 2011, 432; c.f. Suárez 2010,
98–99). On a pragmatic conception of scientific representation, Suárez argues that we must
avoid “[a]n intentionality conception [of scientific representation which]… takes it that
sources and targets are determined by some intentional state of some particular agent or
agents, regardless of community, practice, and indeed any intended or unintended uses”
(Ladyman et al. 2011, 432). As he says elsewhere, scientific representation is not “in the
head” (Suárez 2010, 99). Thus, the relevant account of action which will be able to advance
and deepen pragmatic accounts of scientific representation must not be such that it relies
exclusively on the nature of mental states.
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The second, positive claim offers an idea about what should be included in an
account of action which is capable of playing such a role. What is important, according to
the general ideas described by Suárez, is that we be able to understand the relevant actions
as being communal and socially-based, embedded in the broader practice of science. As he
puts it, scientific representation is to be found “‘in the world’, and more particularly in the
social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by those communities
of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99). As such, a
proper account of action for the purposes at hand will be such that it includes the broader
scientific practice and the context in which the action is performed as essential components
in the process of analysis.
In light of these considerations, it quickly becomes clear that the ‘standard view’ in
analytic philosophy of action will not suffice. The ‘standard view’ or ‘causal theory’ argues
that an action is intentional provided it has the right sort of causal relationship to an agent’s
mental states. That is to say that an action is intentional provided it is caused by intentions,
understood as a particular form of mental state (e.g. a desire or a belief). In light of this
central claim, we can see that it fails to meet the negative claim: that representation will
not be sufficiently explained in terms of mental states. In addition to this basic problem,
there are additional issues with the causal theory of action which makes it unsuitable to the
task at hand.
One of the additional concerns with the causal theory for my purposes is explained
by Harry Frankfurt (1998). The causal theory explains intentional actions in terms of the
causal antecedents of an action (the mental states) and so “direct[s] attention exclusively
away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away from the times at which they
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occur” (Frankfurt 1998, 70). Importantly, this means that the causal theory fails to take
account of the fact that actions are temporally extended. It can explain only what happens
before an action begins. After this point, “the subsequent ‘effects’—i.e., the actual
performance or doing, is simply a matter of nature taking its course” (Frey 2013, 4). As a
philosopher of science who wants to draw our attention closer to scientific practice, this
turns out to be no small failure. The causal theory turns our attention inward toward mental
states, instead of outward towards the broader scientific community and the actual
performances and doings of the scientist who represents.
For these reasons, I avoid the standard account and rely instead upon a different
tradition within philosophy of action which takes the work of G.E.M. Anscombe,
especially her book Intention (2000), as its inspiration. The Anscombean perspective on
the nature of action is markedly different for several reasons, though I will focus on those
which are relevant to the concerns at hand. For one, Anscombe meets the negative claim
made by Suárez, since she is clear that an account of mental states will not suffice as an
account of intentional action. As she says: “intention is never a performance in the mind”
(2000, 49).
Furthermore, Anscombe offers an account of action which draws our attention to
the actions itself. Indeed, she argues that “the only events to consider [in describing
intentional actions] are intentional actions themselves…” (2000, 29). The analysis offered
of intentional actions is made in terms of the descriptions of actions, identified by the
application of a particular sort of “Why?” question. That is, if we ask someone who is
engaged in an act of ɸ-ing, “Why are you ɸ-ing?” and they do not refuse this question, then
the ɸ-ing is intentional (Anscombe 2000, 9). Intentional actions, on her analysis, are
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distinguished in virtue of the form which holds of the action descriptions (Anscombe 2000,
84). The form is seen in the teleological order within the characterizations of an action that
is revealed by the ‘Why?’ question: that someone is A-ing because she’s B-ing and B-ing
because she’s C-ing. It is this teleological, means-end order which reveals the formal
characteristics of practical knowledge: it “shews what good, what use, the action is”
(Anscombe 2005, 114). Importantly, such a conception of intentional actions leaves plenty
of room for the role of the scientific community—in showing the use of an action, in
framing the action descriptions, and so on.
Anscombe’s account has proven to be useful for the purposes of my dissertation,
precisely because it allows that we pay close attention to the scientist’s actions, and their
internal structure in a way which does not exclude or eliminate the role of the broader
scientific community. The influence of Anscombe’s work is most clearly present in chapter
four, in which I offer an account of scientific, representational actions which explicitly
draws upon her views. It is also clear in chapter five, in which I use her work on action
descriptions to defend a view about the relationship between pragmatic accounts of
scientific representation. Though it is less salient, there is a similar influence to be found
in chapter three. In that chapter, I rely upon views presented by Wittgenstein in the
Philosophical Investigations (2009), which influenced Anscombe.
2.

Descriptive Overview of the Five Major Chapters

Below, I will offer a brief overview of each of the chapters of my dissertation, with an eye
towards identifying some of the central themes of the chapters and showing how they
connect to the central project of my dissertation.
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Chapter two is entitled, “An Overview of Philosophical Accounts of Scientific
Representation.” The chapter provides a substantial and in-depth overview of some of the
most influential philosophical and sociological accounts of scientific representation. The
article offers an overview of influential views on scientific representation, arranged in a
semi-historical narrative about the development of views. In addition to overviewing
philosophical accounts of scientific representation, I also cover accounts of the nature of
representation within the model literature and as it is discussed by sociologists of science.
As can be seen, the semi-historical account of the development of the philosophical and
sociological literature on scientific representation plays an important role throughout my
dissertation, providing the more general theoretical context for the other chapters. Among
other things, the second chapter demonstrates the importance of moving forward with
pragmatic accounts by further developing the notions of agency and action which are
central to these accounts.
Chapter three is entitled, “There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation.”
There are two primary objectives of the article. First is a response and argument against
Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen’s influential article, “There Is No Special Problem
about Scientific Representation” (2006). Callender and Cohen argue that the constitution
of representation in science is no different from the constitution of representation in any
other area, for example art or language. So, on their account, the explanation of how it is
that the Lotka-Volterra model represents its target will be exactly the same as why
Picasso’s Guernica represents its target. They are open to what the relevant nature of
representation is, but suggest that the answer will involve a more fundamental
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representational entity like mental states. Thus, they think that philosophers of science have
been “concerned with non-issues” (Callender and Cohen 2006, 67).
I respond by suggesting that there is something unique about representation in
science: the way in which representations are licensed. Licensing is the set of activities by
which the scientific community constructs, develops, establishes, modifies, and uses a
representational vehicle. Indeed, I argue, we cannot understand the nature of representation
in science without being attentive to the element of licensing, which extends beyond mental
states and includes an irreducible reference to the practice in which a representation is
embedded. As such, I take it that there is still significant work to be done by philosophers
of science: in understanding how it is that representational vehicles are licensed and used
by scientists. Thus, one of the major roles of this chapter is clearing intellectual ground for
continued work on the philosophy of scientific representation, by showing that it cannot be
reduced to something more fundamental like mental states.
Chapter four is entitled “The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational
Actions.” In this chapter, I take seriously the idea which lies at the heart of pragmatic
account of scientific representation: that it is grounded in human actions embedded in the
broader scientific practice. Though pragmatic accounts of scientific representation make it
difficult to offer further substantial analysis of the representational relationship (Suárez
2015a, 47; Knuuttila 2009, 144), I begin my chapter by identifying a few ways to move
forward to increase our philosophical understanding of representational practice in science.
One of these ways, which has been and will continue to be explored, is to examine the
nature and role of specific classes of vehicles, like models, diagrams, model organisms,
and so on (as is suggested by Knuuttila 2011). Another way forward is to examine what
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Suárez calls the “means” of scientific representation (2004, 229)—the relationships which
scientists oftentimes utilize in representing. Exploring representational means can include
exploring similarity, isomorphism, and other structural relationships of similarity. But
there is a third way forward, I argue, which has not yet been thoroughly explored: to better
understand the nature of the actions by which scientists represent.
In the chapter, I offer a novel analysis of the nature of scientific, representational
actions. My account relies primarily on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, taking her account
of the nature of intentional actions as a starting point. After introducing her work, I turn to
offer the Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational Actions, in which scientific,
representational actions are demarcated from other forms of actions in virtue of three
features that hold of their internal structure: I) the final description in the means-end
ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim; (II) that interaction with a vehicle distinct
from its target stands as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final description
as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is licensed by scientific practice, in the
sense that I describe in chapter three.
After applying the account to an example involving the Lotka-Volterra model, I
turn to examine some of the payoffs of the account. First, as a novel account of the nature
of scientific, representational actions, the Means-End Account provides a means by which
we can better understand representational practice in science. Instead of paying attention
only to vehicles (like models) or other foundational relationships (like isomorphism), we
can now be attentive to the actions themselves and see their role in representational
practice. Attending to the actions is valuable not only because it helps to illuminate the
foundation upon which pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are built, but also
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because it helps to explain the relationship that holds between the use of vehicles as means
and the achievement of certain ends. Furthermore, the account suggests that every instance
of representation in science is also an instance of some other form of scientific activity: an
explanation, a prediction, an experimentation, and so on. While more work needs to be
done to flesh out this connection, the Means-End Account offers fruitful material for
further reflection on these issues.
The fifth chapter is entitled, “Pragmatic Accounts of Scientific Representation: A
Tapestry of Explanation.” It explores an additional payoff of attending to the foundational
role of action in pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. There are a wide range of
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, each of which offers its own unique
analysis of representation. They are all unified, however, in virtue of their reliance upon
the actions of the representing scientist(s). In this chapter, I argue that the common
foundation of human agency provides a means by which we can understand how the
plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are complementary and indeed
can offer a broader lens through which we can understand representational practice in
science. I review Anscombe’s account of intentional actions and suggest that what each
account offers is a different set of action descriptions or characterizations. I argue that a
single action can have a number of sets of descriptions, each of which is valid, though
which might have different emphases. So, pragmatic accounts of scientific representation
are describing one and the same representational action, though they draw our attention to
different elements and features of the representational action. Most importantly, I argue,
the plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation is useful because it can help
to better understand the complex and heterogeneous practices of scientific representation.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC
REPRESENTATION3
Scientific representation is the important and useful relationship that holds between
scientific sources (e.g. models, theories, data models, etc.) and their targets (e.g. real-world
systems, theoretical objects, etc.). There is a long history of describing the nature of the
representational relationship between concepts and their objects, but the discussion on
scientific representation is a relatively recent discussion within the philosophy of science.
There are a number of different questions one can ask when thinking about scientific
representation. The question which has received the most attention, and which will receive
the most attention here, is what might be called, following Callendar and Cohen (2006, 68)
the “constitution question” of scientific representation: ‘In virtue of what is there
representation between scientific sources and their targets?’ This has been answered in a
wide variety of ways, some arguing that it is a structural identity or similarity which ensures
representation while others argue that there is only a pragmatic relationship. Other
questions about scientific representation relate more specifically to the ways in which
representations are used in science. These questions are more typically asked directly about
certain sorts of representational objects, especially scientific models, as well as from the
perspective of sociology of science.

3

Boesch,
B.
(2015)
Scientific
representation.
Internet
Encyclopedia
http://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-repr/. Reprinted here with permission of publisher.
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of

Philosophy.

1. Substantive Accounts
Scientific representation became a rising topic of interest with the development of
the semantic view of theories which was itself developed partly as a response to the
syntactic view of theories. Briefly, on the syntactic view, theoretical terms are defined in
virtue of relationships of equivalence with observational entities (Suppe 1977). This was
done through the creation of a first-order predicate calculus which contained a number of
logical operators as well as two sets of terms, one set filled with theoretical terms and the
other with observational terms. Each theoretical term was defined in terms of a
correspondence rule linking it directly to an observational term. The logical language also
included a number of axioms, which were relations between theoretical terms. These
axioms were understood as the scientific laws, since they showed relationships that held
among the theoretical terms. Given this purely syntactic relationship between theory and
observed phenomena, there was no need to give any more detailed account of the
representation relationship that held between them. The correspondence rule syntactically
related the theory with observations.
The details of the rejection of the syntactic view are beyond the scope of this article,
but suffice it to say that this view of the structure of theories was widely rejected. With this
rejection came a different account of the structure of theories, what is often called the
semantic view. Since there was no longer any direct syntactic relationship between theory
and observation, it became of interest to explain what relationship does hold between
theories and observations, and ultimately the world.
Before examining the accounts of scientific representation that arose to explain this
relationship, we should get a basic sense of the semantic view of theories. The common
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feature of the semantic approach to scientific theories was that they should not be thought
of as a set of axioms and defined syntactic correspondence between theory and observation.
Instead, theories are “extralinguistic entities which may be described or characterised by a
number of different linguistic formulations” (Suppe 1977, 221). That is to say, theories are
not tied to a single formulation or even to a particular logical language. Instead theories are
thought of as being a set of related models. This is better understood through Bas van
Fraassen’s (1980) example.
Van Fraassen (1980, 41–43) asks us to consider a set of axioms which are
constituents of a theory which will be called T1:
A0 There is at least one line.
A1 For any two lines, there is at most one point that lies on both.
A2 For any two points, there is exactly one line that lies on both.
A3 On every line there lie at least two points.
A4 There are only finitely many points.
In Figure 2.1, we can see a model which shows that T1 is consistent, since each of the
axioms is satisfied by this model.

Figure 2.1 Model of Consistency of T1
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Notice this is just one model which shows the consistency of T1, since there are
other models which could be constructed to satisfy the axioms, like van Fraassen’s “Seven
Point Geometry” (1980, 42). Note that what is meant here by ‘model’ is whatever “satisfies
the axioms of a theory” (Van Fraassen 1980, 43). Another, perhaps more intuitive, way of
expressing this is that a model for any theory T is any model which would make T true iif
the model were the entirety of the universe. For example, if Figure 1 were the entirety of
the universe, then clearly T1 would be true. Notice also that, on the semantic view, the
axioms themselves are not central in understanding the theory. Instead, what is important
in understanding a theory is understanding the set of models which are each truth-makers
for that theory, insofar as they satisfy the theory.
This account of the structure of theories can be applied to an actual scientific theory,
like classical mechanics. Here, following Ronald Giere (1988, 78–79), we can take up the
example of the idealized simple systems in physics. These are, he argues, models for the
theory of classical mechanics. For example, the simple harmonic oscillator is a model
which is a truth-maker for (part of) classical mechanics. The simple harmonic oscillator
can be described as a machine: “a linear oscillator with a linear restoring force and no
others” (Giere 1988, 79); or mathematically: F = -kx. This model, were it the entirety of
the universe, would make classical mechanics true.
The targets of theoretical models on the semantic view are not always real world
systems. On some views, there is at least one other set of models which serve as the targets
for theoretical models. These are variably called empirical substructures (Van Fraassen
1980) or data models. These are ways of structuring the empirical data, typically with some
mathematical or algebraic method. When scientists gather and describe empirical data, they
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tend to think of and describe it in an already partially structured way. Part of this structure
is the result of the way in which scientists measure the phenomena while being particularly
attentive to certain features (and ignoring or downplaying others). Another part of this
structuring is due to the patterns seen in the data which are in need of explanation. On some
views, most notably van Fraassen’s (1980), the empirical model is the phenomenon which
is being represented. That is to say, there is no further representational relationship holding
between data models and the world, at least as scientific practice is concerned (for a
discussion of this, see (Brading and Landry 2006)). Others argue that the relationship
between theoretical models and data models is only one of a number of interesting
representational relationships to be described, which set themselves up in a hierarchical
structure (French and Ladyman 1999, 112–14).
With this semantic account of the structure of scientific theories in place, there
arose an interest to give an account of the representational relationship. The views which
arose with the semantic view of theories are here called “substantive,” because they all
attempt to give an account of the representational relationship which looks to substantive
features of the source and target. Another way of putting this (following Knuuttila (2005))
is to say that the substantive accounts of representation seek to explain representation as a
dyadic relationship which holds between only the source and the target. As will be
discussed below, this is different from the deflationary and pragmatic accounts which view
scientific representation as at least a triadic relationship insofar as they add an agent to the
relationship. There are two major classifications of substantive accounts of the
representational relationship. The first are the structuralist views which are divided into
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three main types: isomorphism, partial isomorphism, and homomorphism. The second
category is the similarity views.
1.2. Structuralist Views
Generically, the structuralist views claim that scientific representation occurs in
virtue of what might be called “mapping” relationships that hold between the structure of
the source and the structure of the target, i.e. the parts of the theoretical models point to the
parts of the data models.
1.2.1. Isomorphism
Isomorphism holds between two objects provided that there is a bijective
function—i.e., both injective (or one-to-one) and surjective (or onto)—between the source
and the target. Formally, suppose there are two sets, set A and set B. Set A is isomorphic
to set B (and vice versa) if and only if there is a function, call it f, which could be
constructed between A and B which would take each member of set A and map it to one
and only one member of set B such that each member of set B is mapped.
To make the point more clear, let us suppose that set A is full of the letters of the
English alphabet and set B is full of the natural numbers 1 through 26. We could create a
function which, when given a letter of the alphabet, will output a number. Let’s make the
function easy to understand and let f(A) = 1, f(B) = 2, and so on, according to typical
alphabetical order. This function is bijective because each letter is mapped to one and only
one number and every number (1 - 26) is being picked out by one and only one letter.
Notice that since we can draw a bijective function from the letters to the numbers, we can
also create one from the numbers to the letters: most simply, let f’(1) = A, f’(2) = B, and so
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on. Of course, there is nothing apart from the ease of our understanding which requires that
we link A and 1, since we could have linked 1 with any letter and vice versa.
Isomorphism has frequently been used to explain representation (Van Fraassen
1980; Brading and Landry 2006). Since theories, on the semantic view, are a group of
related models, there is a certain sort of structure that each of these models has. Most of
the time, they are thought of as mathematical models though they need not be only
mathematical as long as they have a structure. Van Fraassen also identifies what he calls
“appearances,” which he defines as “the structures which can be described in experimental
and measurement reports” (1980, 64). So, the appearances are the measurable, observable
structures which are being represented (the targets of the representation). On van
Fraassen’s account, a theory will be successfully representational provided that there is an
isomorphic relationship between the empirical substructures (the sources) and the
appearances (as targets), and an isomorphic relationship between the theoretical models (as
sources) and the empirical substructures (as targets). (Or at any rate, this is how he has
commonly been interpreted (see Ladyman et al. 2011). As described by Mauricio Suárez,
this isomorphism between the models shows that there is an identity that holds between the
“relational framework of the structures” of the source and the target (2003, 228). And it is
this relational framework of structures which is being maintained.
So, on the isomorphism view of scientific representation, some scientific theory
represents some target phenomena in virtue of a bijective mapping between the structures
of a theory and data, and a bijective mapping between the data and the phenomena. Notice
that on the isomorphic view, the bijections which account for representation are external
to the theoretical language. That is to say that the relationship that holds between the theory
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and the phenomena is not internal to the language in which the theory is presented. This is
an important feature of this account because it allows for a mapping between very different
kinds of structures. Presumably the (mainly mathematical) structures of theories are quite
different from the structures of data models and are certainly very different from the
structures of the phenomena (because the phenomena are not themselves mathematical
entities). However, since the functions are external, we can create a function which will
map these very different types of structures to one another.
1.2.2. Partial Isomorphism
Isomorphism has much to suggest for it, especially when focusing in particular on
those theories which are expressed mathematically. This is especially true in more
mathematically-driven fields like physics. It seems that the mathematical models in physics
are representing the structure that holds between various real world phenomena. For
example, F=ma represents the way in which certain features of an object (its mass, the rate
at which it is being accelerated) correspond to other features (its force). However, many
philosophers (e.g., Cartwright 1983; Cartwright, Shomar, and Suárez 1995) have pointed
out that there are cases where a theory or model truly represents some phenomena, even
though there are features of the phenomena which do not have any corresponding structure
in the theory or model, due to abstraction or idealization.
Take a rather simple example, the billiard ball model of a gas (French and Ladyman
1999). Drawing on Mary Hesse’s (1966) important work on models, French and Ladyman
argue that there are certain features of the model which are taken to be representative, e.g.
the mass and the velocity of the billiard balls represent the mass and velocity of gas atoms.
There are also certain features of the billiard balls which are non-representational, e.g. the
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colors of the balls. Most importantly, though, as a critique of isomorphism, there are
typically also some undetermined features of the balls. That is to say, for some of the
features of the model, it is unknown whether they are representational or not. For a more
detailed scientific example, see Cartwright, Shomar, and Suárez (1995).
To respond to problems of this sort, many (Bueno 1997; French and Ladyman 1999;
French 2003; Da Costa and French 2003) have argued for partial isomorphism. The basic
idea is that there are partial structures of a theory for which we can define three sets of
members for some relation. The first set will be those members which do have the relevant
relation, the second set will be those members which do not have that relation, and the third
will be those members for which it is unknown whether or not they have that relation. It is
possible to think of each of these sets of individuals as being a relation itself (since a
relation, semantically speaking, is extensionally defined), and so we could draw a bijective
function between these relations. But, as long as the third relation (the third set of
individuals for which it was unknown whether or not they had the relation) is not empty,
then the isomorphism will be only partial because there are some relations for which we
are unsure whether or not they hold in the target.
As a more concrete example, consider the billiard ball and atom example from
above. In order for there to be a partial isomorphism between the two, we must be able to
identify two partial structures of each system, i.e. a partial structure of the billiard ball
model and a partial structure of the gas atoms. Between these partial structures, there must
be a bijective function which maps relations of the model to relations of the gas-system.
For example, the velocity of the billiard balls will be mapped to the velocity of respective
atoms. There must be a second function which maps those non-representational relations
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of the model to features of the gas-system which are not being represented. For example, a
non-representative feature of the model, like the color of the billiard balls, will be mapped
to some feature of the system which is not being represented, like the non-color of the
atoms. All the same, this will still remain partial because there will be certain relations that
the model has which are unknown (or undefined) in relationship to the gas-system.
1.1.3. Homomorphism
Homomorphism, defended by Bartels (2006), is more general than isomorphism
insofar as all isomorphisms are homomorphisms, but not all homomorphisms are
isomorphisms. Homomorphisms still rely on a function being drawn between two sets, but
they do not require that the function be bijective; i.e. the function need not be one-to-one
or onto. So, this means that not every relation and part of the theory must map on to one
and only one relation or part of the target systems. Additionally, this permits that there be
parts and relations in the target system which are unmapped. Homomorphisms allow for a
great deal of flexibility with regard to misrepresentations.
1.2. Similarity
Isomorphism (and the other -morphisms) places a fairly strict requirement on the
relevant constitutive features of representation, which are on these views structural. But,
as Giere points out (1988, 80–81), this is often not the relevant relationship. Oftentimes,
scientists are working with theories or models which are valuable not for their salient
structural features, but rather for some other reason. For example, when modeling the
behavior of water flowing through pipes, scientists often model the water as a continuous
fluid, even though it is actually a collection of discrete molecules (Giere 2004). Here, the
representational value of the model is not between the structure of the model and the
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structure of the world (since water is structurally not continuous, but rather a collection of
discrete molecules). Instead, the relevant representational value comes from a more general
relationship which holds between the behavior of the modeled and real world systems.
Giere suggests that what is needed is “a weaker interpretation of the relationship between
model and real system” (1988, 81). His suggestion is that we explain representation in
virtue of similarity. On his account a model will represent some real world system insofar
as it is similar to the real world system. Notice that this is a much weaker account of
representation than the structural accounts, since similarity includes structural similarities,
and so encompasses isomorphism, partial isomorphism, and homomorphism.
Of course, if we try hard enough, we can notice similarities between any two
objects. For example, any two material objects are similar at least insofar as they are each
material. Thus, Giere suggests that an account of scientific representation which appeals to
similarity requires an “implicit” (or explicit) “specification of relevant respects and
degrees” (Giere 1988, 81). Respects indicate the relevant parts and ways in which the
model is taken to be representative. Perhaps it is some dynamical relationship expressed in
an equation; perhaps it is some physical similarity that exists between some tangible model
and some target object (e.g. a plastic model of a benzene ring); perhaps it is the way in
which two parts of a model are able to interact with one another, which shows how two
objects in the target system might interact (like the relevant behavior of the model of water
flowing through pipes). The limitations with regard to claims of the respects of similarity
are limited only by what scientists know or take to be the case about the model and the
target system. For example, a scientist could not claim that there was a similarity between
the color of a benzene model and a benzene ring since benzene rings have no color.
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Similarly, a scientist could not claim that there is similarity between the color of a
mathematical model and the color of a species of bacteria since a mathematical model does
not have any color. Notice that it is insufficient to merely specify the respects in which a
model is similar since similarity can come in degrees. Of course, there is a whole spectrum
of degrees of similarity on which any particular similarity can fall. A source can be
anywhere from an extremely vague approximation of its target to being nearly identical to
its target (what Giere calls “exact” (1988, 93)) and everywhere in between.
Giere’s own example is that, “The positions and velocities of the earth and moon
in the earth-moon system are very close to those of a two-particle Newtonian model with
an inverse square central force” (1988, 80). Here, the relevant respects are the position and
velocity of the earth and moon. The relevant degree is that the positions and velocities in
the earth-moon system are “very close” to the two-particle Newtonian model. These
respects and degrees thus give us an account of how we should think of the similarity
between the model and the target system.
Giere uses similarity to describe the relationship between models and the real-world
systems they represent, and sometimes between different models (one model may be a
generalization of another, and so on). Theories themselves are constituted by a set of these
models as well as some hypotheses that link the models to the real world which define the
respect and degree of the similarity between the models and their targets.
More recently, Weisberg (2013) has argued for a similarity account of
representation. In brief, his view argues that two sets of things be distinguished in both
source and target: the attributes and the mechanisms. In distinguishing these sets, an
equation can be written in which the common attributes and mechanisms can be thought of
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as the intersection of the attributes of the model and of the target system, and the
intersection of the mechanisms of the model and target system. The dissimilarities can also
be identified in a similar fashion. He adds some terms to these sets which are weighting
terms and functions. These allow the users to indicate which similarities are more important
than others. Rewriting the equation as a ratio between similarities and dissimilarities will
result in a method by which we can make comparative judgments about different models.
In this way, we will be able to say, for example, that one model is more or less similar than
another.
1.3. Critiques of Substantive Accounts
While similarity and isomorphism continue to have some support in the
contemporary literature (especially in modified versions, see below, section 3c), the
versions described above have faced serious criticisms. One of the most common
arguments against the substantive views is that they are unable to handle
misrepresentations (Suárez 2003, 233–35; Frigg 2006, 51). Many models in science do not
accurately reflect the world, and, in fact, the model is often viewed as particularly useful
because of (not in spite of) the misrepresentations. Nancy Cartwright (1983) has famously
argued for a fictional account of modelling and made this case for the laws of physics.
Others have shown that similar things are true in other scientific domains (Weisberg
2007a). When the theories are intentionally inaccurate, there will be difficulty in explaining
the way in which these theories are representational (as scientists and philosophers often
take them to be), with reference to isomorphism or similarity.
Suárez (2003, 235–37) has also argued that both similarity and isomorphism are
each neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. Consider first isomorphism. It
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must be the case that it is not necessary for representation, given that scientists often take
certain theories to be representative of their real-world targets even though there is no
isomorphic relationship between the theory and the target system. The same is true of
similarity. Using his example, suppose that there is an artist painting an ocean view, using
some blue and green paints. This painting has all sorts of similarities to the ocean view she
is representing, one of which is that both the painting and the ocean are on the same relative
side of the moon, are both in her line of vision at time t, share certain colors, etc. But which
ones are relevant to its being representative and which are more contingent is up to the
discretion of the agent who takes it to be representative of the ocean view in certain respects
(as Giere argued). But if this is the case, then it turns out that A represents B if and only if
A and B are similar in those respects in which A represents B. This ultimately leaves
representation unexplained.
Supposing we can give some account of salience or attention or some other sociallybased response to this first problem (which seems possible), we are left with the problem
that plenty of salient similarities are non-representational. Suárez makes this point with
Picasso's Guernica (2003, 236). The bull, crying mother, eye, knife, etc. are all similar to
certain real-world objects. But the painting is not a representation of these other things. It
is representing some of the horrible atrocities of Franco.
Suárez also argues that both similarity and isomorphism are insufficient for
representation. Consider the first, similarity. Take any given manufactured item, for
example, an Acer C720 Chromebook, a computer which is similar to many other computers
(hundreds of thousands). Notice that the fact of its similarity is insufficient to make it
represent any of the other computers. Even if we add in Giere’s requirement that there be
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hypotheses which define the respects and degrees of the similarity, the insufficiency will
remain. In fact, it seems as though there are hypotheses which define the relevant respects
and degrees of similarity between the computers: Acer’s engineers and quality control have
made sure that the production of these computers will result in similar computers. All the
same, even with these hypotheses which give respects and degrees, we would not want to
say that any given computer represents the others.
The non-sufficiency problem holds for isomorphism as well. Suppose someone
were to write down some equation which had various constants and variables, and
expressed certain relationships that held between the parts of the equation. Suppose now
that, against all odds, this equation turns out to be isomorphic to some real-world system,
say, that it describes the relationship between rising water temperatures and the
reproduction rate of some species of fish which is native to mountain streams in the
Colorado Rockies. To many, it appears to be counterintuitive to think that representations
could happen accidentally. However, if isomorphism is sufficient for representation, then
we would have to admit that the randomly composed equation does represent this fish
species, even if no one ever uses or even recognizes the isomorphic relationship.
There are other arguments against these views in general, an important one being
that they lack the right logical properties. Drawing on the work of Goodman ( 1976), both
Suárez (2003, 232–33) and Roman Frigg (2006, 54) argue that representation has certain
logical properties which are not shared by similarity or isomorphism. Representation is
non-symmetric, so when some A represents B, it does not follow that B represents A.
Representation is non-transitive: if A represents B and B represents C, it does not follow
that A represents C. It’s also non-reflexive: A does not represent itself. Since isomorphism
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is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, and similarity is reflexive and symmetric, they do
not have the properties required to account for representation.
There are replies to these arguments on behalf of the substantive views. First, there
is a general question about whether or not we are justified in making inferences from
representation in art to representation in science. As was discussed above, many of the
criticisms against substantive views draw examples from the domain of art (e.g., Suárez’s
(2003) uses many examples of paintings and is drawing upon Goodman’s (1976) which
discusses representation in art). But, it should not be taken as given that what holds in art
must translate to science. In fact, in many cases, the practices in art seem to be quite
different from the practices in science. As Bueno and French say, “After all, what do
paintings—in particular those that are given as counter-examples to our approach, which
are drawn from abstract art—really have to do with scientific representation?” (2011, 879).
Following Anjan Chakravartty (2010), Bueno and French (2011) argue that
something like similarity or partial isomorphism is, in fact, necessary for successful
representation in science. If there were no similarity or isomorphism at all, the successful
use of models “would be nothing short of a miracle” (2011, 885). That is to say, while
similarity or partial isomorphism might not be the whole story, they are at least part of the
story. Using the aforementioned example of Picasso’s Guernica, they note that “there has
to be some partial isomorphism between the marks on the canvass and specific objects in
the world in order for our understanding of what Guernica represents to get off the ground”
(2011, 885).
Replies have been made to the other arguments as well. Bueno and French (2011)
argue that their account of partial isomorphism can meet all of the criticisms raised by
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Suárez (2003) and Frigg (2006). Adam Toon (2012)discusses some of the ways in which
supporters of a similarity account of representation might respond to criticisms. Bartels
(2006) defends the homomorphism account against these criticisms.
2. Deflationary and Pragmatic Views
If, as these scholars have argued, these substantive views will not work to explain
scientific representation, what will? Suárez (Suárez 2015a) argues that what is needed
instead is a deflationary account. A deflationary account claims “that there is no substantive
property or relation at stake” (Suárez 2015a, 37) in debates about scientific representation.
Deflationary accounts are typically marked by a couple of features. First, a deflationary
account will deny that there are any necessary and sufficient conditions of scientific
representation, or if there are, they will lack any explanatory value with regard to the nature
of scientific representation. Second, these accounts will typically view representation as a
relationship which is deeply tied to scientific practice. As Suárez puts it, “it is impossible,
on a deflationary account, for the concept of representation in any area of science to be at
variance with the norms that govern representational practice in that area...representation
in that area, if anything at all, is nothing but that practice” (Suárez 2015a, 38).
Already we can see that these views will be quite different from the substantive
views. Each of these views was substantive in the sense that they gave necessary and
sufficient conditions for representation. There was also a distinct way in which these views
were detached from scientific practice, since whether something was representational had
little to do with whether or not it was accepted by scientists as representational and more
to do with the features of the source and target. In each case, it was a relationship that was
entirely accounted for by features of the theory or model and the target system. As
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Knuuttila (2005) describes it, these were all dyadic (two-place) accounts insofar as the
relationship held between only two things. The deflationary accounts take a markedly
different direction by moving to at least a triadic (three-place) account of representation.
In some cases, the views that have developed have followed the general lead of
many deflationary views in giving a central role to the work of an agent in representation.
These views do not classify as deflationary, given that they still give necessary and
sufficient conditions of representation. Given the importance of the role of agents and aims,
we might call these views pragmatic. Although pragmatic and deflationary views are
importantly distinct in their aims, they share many common threads and in many cases, the
views could be reinterpreted as deflationary or pragmatic with little effort. As such, they
will be grouped together in this section.
2.1. DDI
The earliest deflationary account of representation was RIG Hughes’ DDI Account
(1997). The DDI Account consists of three parts: denotation, demonstration, and
interpretation. Denotation is the way in which a model or theory can reference, symbolize,
or otherwise act as a stand-in for the target system. The sort of denotation being invoked
by Hughes is broad enough to include the denotation of concrete particulars (e.g. a model
of the solar system will denote particular planets), the denotation of specific types (e.g.
Bohr’s theory models not just this hydrogen atom, but all hydrogen atoms), and the
denotation of a model of some global theory (e.g. this particular model is “represented as
a quantum system” (Hughes 1997, S331)). In each case, the model denotes something else;
it stands in for some particular concrete object, some type of theoretical object, or some
type of dynamical system.
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We might think this relationship sufficient for representation, since the fact that
scientists treat certain objects or parts of models as being stand-ins or symbols for some
target system seems to answer the question of the relationship between a model and the
world. Hughes, though, thinks that in order to understand scientific representation, we need
to examine how it is actually used in scientific practice. This requires additional steps of
analysis. The second part of Hughes’ DDI Account is demonstration. This is a feature by
which models “contain resources which enable us to demonstrate the results we are
interested in” (Hughes 1997, S332). That is, models are typically “representations-as,”
meaning not only do scientists represent some target object or system, but they also
represent it in a certain way with certain features made to be salient. The nature of this
salience is such that it allows users to draw certain types of conclusions and make certain
predictions, both novel and not. This is demonstration in the sense that the models are the
vehicles through which (or in which) these insights can be drawn or demonstrated,
physically, geometrically, mathematically, etc. This requires that they be workable or used
in certain ways.
The final part of the DDI Account is interpretation. It is insufficient that the models
demonstrate some particular insight. The insight must be interpreted in terms of the target
system. That is to say, scientists can use the models as vehicles of the demonstration, but
in doing so, part of the representational process as defended in the DDI Account is that
scientists interpret the demonstrated insights or results not as features of the model, but
rather as features which apply to the target system (or at least, the way scientists are
thinking of the target system).
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In summary, with denotation, we are moving in thought from some target system
to a model. We take a model or its parts to stand in or symbolize some target system or
object. In demonstration, we use the model as a vehicle to come to certain insights,
predictions, or results with regard to the relationship that holds internal to the model. It is
in interpretation that we move from the model back to the world, taking the results or
insights gained through use of the model to be about the target system or object in the
world.
2.2.Inferential
2.2.1. Suárez
After criticizing the substantive accounts in his (2003), Suárez (2004) developed
his own account of representation which focused centrally on inference and inferential
capacities, what he calls an inferential conception of representation. As he describes it
there, this account involves two parts. The first part is what he calls representational force.
Representational force is defined as “the capacity of a source to lead a competent and
informed user to a consideration of the target” (Suárez 2004, 768). Representational force
can exist for a number of reasons. One way to get representational force is to repeatedly
use the source as a representation of the target. Another way is in virtue of intended
representational uses, that is, in virtue of the intention of the creator or author of some
source viewed within the context of a broader scientific community. Oftentimes, the
representational force will occur as a combination of the two. It is also a contextual
property, insofar as it requires that the agent using the source has the relevant contextual
knowledge to be able to go from the source to the (correct/intended) target.
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So, for example, in the upper left-hand corner of my word processor is a little
blueish square with a smaller white square and a small dark circle inside of it (it is supposed
to be an image of a floppy disk). This has representational force insofar as it allows me to
go from the source (the image of the floppy disk) to the target (a means of saving the
document which I am currently writing). In this case, the representational force exists in
virtue of both the intended representational uses (the creators of this word processor surely
intend this symbol to stand in for this activity) as well as repeated uses (I am part of a
society which has, in the past, repeatedly used an image of a floppy disk to get to this target,
not only in this program but in many others as well). It is also contextual: someone who
had never used computers would not have the requisite knowledge to be able to use the
icon correctly.
This is part of the story for Suárez, but in order to have scientific representation
there must be something more than mere representational force. On his view, scientific
representations are subject to a sort of objectivity which does not necessarily exist for other
representations, e.g. the example above of the save icon. The objectivity is not meant to
indicate that there is somehow an independent representational relationship that exists in
the world when scientists are engaged in scientific representation. Instead, the objectivity
is present insofar as representations are constrained in various ways by the relevant features
of the targets system which is being represented. That is, because there is some real feature
which scientists are intentionally trying to represent in their scientific models and theories,
the representation cannot be arbitrary but must respond to these relevant features. So the
constraints are themselves objective, but this does not commit Suárez to identifying some
reified relationship that holds between sources and targets.

34

According to Suárez, if we are going to get this objectivity in representations, we
must turn to a second feature: the capacity of a source to allow for surrogate reasoning.
This second feature requires that informed and competent agents be led to draw specific
inferences regarding the target. These inferences can be the result of “any type of
reasoning…as long as [the source] is the vehicle of the reasoning that leads an agent to
draw inferences regarding [the target]” (Suárez 2004, 773). Suárez’s point here is that not
only does the source lead the agent to the target, but also it leads the agent to think about
the target in a particular way, coming to particular insights and inferences with respect to
the source.
More recently, Suárez (2010) has argued that this second feature, the capacity for
surrogate reasoning, typically requires that three things be in place. First, the source must
have internal structure such that certain relations between parts can be identified and
examined. Secondly, when examining the parts of the source, scientists must do so in terms
of the target’s parts. Finally, there must be a set of norms defined by the scientific practice
which define and limit which inferences are “correct” or intended. It is in virtue of these
norms of the practice that an agent will be able to draw the relevant and intended inferences,
making the representation a part of that particular scientific practice. Of course, he takes
his view to be deflationary, so these are not to be understood as necessary and sufficient
conditions of the capacity for surrogate reasoning, but rather features which are frequently
in place.
Consider an example of a mathematical model, for example the Lotka-Volterra
equation. The model is supposed to be representational of predator-prey relationships. Part
of this is Suárez’s representational force—the fact that competent agents will be lead to
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consider predator-prey relationships when considering the source. However, as Suárez
notes, this is insufficient for scientific representation because in science the terms interact
in a non-arbitrary way. To account for this, he argues that there is another feature of the
model, which is the capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning. In this case, that means that
individuals who examine or manipulate the model in terms of its parts (the multiple
variables) will be able to draw certain inferences about the nature of real-world interactions
between predators and prey (the parts of the target system). These insights will occur in
part due to the nature of the model as well as the norms of scientific practice, which means
that the inferences will be non-arbitrarily related to the real-world phenomena and will
afford us to recognize certain specified inferences of scientific interest.
2.2.2. Contessa
Suárez’s inferential account has been further developed by Gabriele Contessa
(Contessa 2007, 2011). He is explicit in his claim that the interpretational view he is
defending is not a deflationary account, but is rather a substantive version of the inferential
account insofar as he takes the account to give necessary and sufficient conditions of
representation. All the same, the account he defends is clearly pragmatic in nature.
Contessa begins by noting an important distinction he has drawn from Suárez’s work, that
of the difference between three types of representation. The first is mere denotation, in
which some (arbitrarily) chosen sign is taken to stand for some object. He gives the
example of the logo of the London Underground denoting the actual system of trains and
tracks.
The second sort of representation is what Contessa calls “epistemic representation”
(2007, 52). An epistemic representation is one which allows surrogate reasoning of the sort
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described by Suárez. The London Underground logo does not have this feature since no
one would be able to use it to figure out how to navigate. A map of the London
Underground, on the other hand, would have this feature insofar as it could be used by an
agent to draw these sorts of inferences.
The final sort of representation is what he calls “faithful epistemic representation”
(Contessa 2007, 54–55). Whether or not a representation is faithful is a matter of degree,
so something will be a completely faithful epistemic representation provided all of the valid
inferences which can be drawn about the target using the source as a vehicle will also be
sound. Notice this does not require that a model user be able to draw every possible
inference about the target, but rather that the inferences licensed by the map that are drawn
will be sound inferences (both following from the source and true of the target). In this
sense, a map of the London Underground produced yesterday will be more faithful than
one produced in the 1930s.
Using this framework, Contessa goes on to describe a scientific model as an
epistemic representation of features of particular target systems (2007, 56). The scientific
model will be representational for a user when she interprets the source in terms of the
target. He remains open to there being multiple sorts of interpretation which are relevant,
but suggests that the most common sort of interpretation is “analytic,” which functions
quite similarly to an isomorphism in which every part and relation of the source is
interpreted as denoting one and only one part and relation in the target (and all of the
target’s parts and relations are denoted by some part or relation from the source).
Of course, given that this is determined by the agent’s use, it is not necessary that
the agent believe that her interpretation is actually the case about the system. Here is where
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Contessa draws on the distinction of faithfulness. Since models are often
misrepresentations and idealizations as has been discussed above, they need not be
completely faithful in order to be useful. This is not the end of the story, though, because
the circumstances also play an important role in understanding whether or not something
is a scientific representation.
2.3. Agent-Based Versions of Substantive Accounts
In light of some of the insights of Suárez and others, many of the views described
above as substantive views were altered and updated to more explicitly and centrally make
reference to the role of an agent, making them what could be called agent-centered
approaches. Of most importance, given their role in the substantive views as described
above are recent advances made by van Fraassen and Giere.
2.3.1. Agent-Based Isomorphism
The view of isomorphism commonly attributed to van Fraassen, which was
described above, was the one drawn from his book, The Scientific Image (1980). More
recently, van Fraassen has presented an altered account of representation, which places
much more emphasis on the role of an agent (2008). Van Fraassen notes that while some
reference to an agent was a part of his earlier views (Ladyman et al. 2011), Suárez’s
important work on deflationary accounts was influential in the development of the view he
defends (Van Fraassen 2008, 7).
He begins his account by looking primarily to the way in which a representation is
used, saying that a source’s being representative of some target “depends largely, and
sometimes only” on the way in which the source is being used (2008, 23). Though he does
not take himself to be offering any substantive theory of representation, he does call this
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the Hauptsatz or primary claim of his account of representation: “There is no representation
except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent things thus and
so” (Van Fraassen 2008, 23). Van Fraassen notices that this places some restrictions on
what can possibly be representational. Mental images are limited, because they are not
made or used in some way. That is to say, we do not give our mental states representational
roles. Similarly, there is no such thing as a representation produced naturally. What it is to
be a representation is to be taken or used as a representation, and this is not something that
happens spontaneously without the influence of an agent.
Van Fraassen also notices an important distinction in two ways of representing:
representation of and representation as. When scientists take or use some source to be
representational, they take it to be a representation of some target. This target can change
based on context, and sometimes scientists might not even use the source to be a
representation at all. Consider van Fraassen’s example: we can use a graph to represent the
growth of bacterial colonies under certain conditions, and so the graph will be a
representation of bacterial growth (2008, 27). But we could also use that graph to represent
other phenomena, perhaps the acceleration of an object as it is dropped from some height.
Part of what this captures is the way in which our perspectives can change the way in which
we are representing a particular appearance. Thus, by using a source in some distinct way,
we can represent some particular appearance of some particular phenomena.
In intentionally using a source as a representation, scientists do not only make it a
representation of something, but they also represent it in a certain light, making certain
features salient. This is what van Fraassen calls representation as. Two representations can
be of the same target, but might represent that target as something different. Van Fraassen
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offers an example: everything that has a heart also has a kidney, but representing some
organism as having a heart does not mean the same thing as representing it as has having
kidneys (2008, 27). Similarly, we might represent the growth of bacteria mentioned above
as an example of a certain sort of growth model or as the worsening of some infection as it
is seen as part of a disease process.
Of course, all of this is very general, which van Fraassen acknowledges. However,
in a true deflationary attitude, he notices that there is no good way of getting more specific
about scientific representation since it has “variable polyadicity: for every such
specification we add there will be another one” (2008, 29). Nonetheless, he still maintains
that the link between a good or useful representation and phenomena requires a similarity
in structure. As it stands, then, there is still an appeal to isomorphism present in his account:
“A model can (be used to) represent a given phenomenon accurately only if it has a
substructure isomorphic to that phenomenon” (2008, 309). Just as before, we have an
account of representation which relies on isomorphism between the structure of the
theoretical models and the (structure of) the phenomena. All the same, this is still a
markedly different view from his earlier view described above. No longer is it the
isomorphism or structural relationship alone which is representational. Now, on van
Fraassen’s views, it is the fact that a scientific community uses it or takes it to be
representational.
2.3.2. Agent-Based Similarity
Ian Hacking (1983) has famously argued that, in philosophical discussions of the
role and activity of science, too much emphasis is put on representation. Instead, he
suggests that much of what is done in science is intervening, and this concept of
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intervention is key to understanding the reality with which science is engaged. All the
same, he still thinks that science can and does represent. Representation, on his account, is
a human activity which exhibits itself in a number of different styles. It is people who make
representations, and typically, they do so in terms of a likeness, which he takes to be a basic
concept. Representation in terms of likeness, he thinks, is essential to being human, and he
even speculates that it may have played a role in development like many think language
did. In creating a likeness, though, he argues that there is no analyzable relation being
made. Instead, “[likeness] creates the terms in a relation…First there is representation, and
then there is ‘real’” (Hacking 1983, 139). Representation on his view is not interested in
being true or false, since the representation precedes the real.
Giere (2004, 2010) has also made pragmatics more central and explicit to his
account of scientific representation. He claims that in attempting to understand
representation in science we should not begin with some independent two-place
relationship, which substantially exists in the world. Instead, we should begin with the
activity of representing. If we are going to view this activity as a relationship, it will have
more than two places. He proposes a four-place relation: “S uses X to represent W for
purposes P” (2004, 743). Here, S will be some agent broadly construed, such that it could
be some individual scientist, or less specifically some group of scientists. X is any
representational object, including models, graphs, words, photographs, computational
models, and theories. W is some aspect or feature of the world and P are the aims and goals
of the representational activity; i.e. the reasons why the scientist is using the source to
represent the target. Giere identifies a number of different potential purposes of
representation. These include things like learning what something is actually like, but are
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fairly contextual and depend upon the question being asked. So the way in which something
is modeled might change depending on the purposes of the representation (2004, 749–50).
Giere is still working from what should be considered a semantic conception of
theories, in which a theory is a set of models which are created according to a set of
principles and certain specific conditions. The principles are what we might otherwise think
of as being empirical laws, but he does not conceive of them as having empirical truth.
Instead, by thinking of them as principles by which scientists can form models, it is these
scientists who construct and use the models who make particular the otherwise general and
idealized principles. On this view, then, it is the models which are representational and will
link up to the empirical world.
There are many ways a scientist can use a model to represent the world, on Giere’s
view, but the most important way remains similarity. Giere is quick to note that this does
not mean that we need to think of the representational relationship as some objective or
substantive relationship in the world. Instead, the scientist who uses the model does the
representing and she will often do this in virtue of picking out certain salient features of a
model which are similar to the target system. In doing so, the scientist specifies the relevant
aspects and degrees of similarity which she is using in her act of representation.
One of the advantages of this updated version of the similarity view is the wide
range of models which can be effectively representational on this account (Giere 2010).
Giere gives an example of a time when he saw a nuclear physicist treat a pencil as a model
of a beam of protons, explaining how the beam could be polarized. It is in virtue of the
invoked similarity between the pencil and a beam of photons, i.e. the fact that the physicist
specifically used a relevant similarity, that he was able to use it to represent the beam of
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photons. By noting the importance of the role of the agent, Giere is better able to explain
the scientific representation which occurs in the whole range of scientific representations.
A similar yet importantly distinct account of representation as similarity is defended
by Paul Teller (2001). Teller argues that we should abandon what he calls the ‘perfect
model’ model, in which we take scientists to model in a way that is perfectly correspondent
with the real world targets. Instead, he thinks that models are rarely, if ever, perfect matches
for their targets. This does not mean that models are not representations. He argues that
models represent their targets in virtue of similarity, though he denies that any general
account of similarity can be given. What makes something a similarity depends deeply
upon the circumstances at hand including the interests of the model user.
2.4. Gricean
One way to ‘deflate’ the problem of scientific representation is to claim that there
is no special problem for scientific representation, and instead argue that we should
understand the question of scientific representation as part of the already widely discussed
literature on representation in general. This is the project taken up by Craig Callender and
Jonathan Cohen (2006). According to their view, representation in many different fields
(art, science, language, etc.) can be explained by more fundamental representations, which
are common to each of the fields.
To explain this, they appeal to what they call “General Griceanism”, which takes
its general framework from the insights of Paul Grice. On their General Gricean view, the
representational nature of scientific objects will be explained in terms of something more
fundamentally representational. The more fundamentally representational objects in this
case are mental states. This, in effect, pushes the hard philosophical problem back a stage,
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since some account must be given with regard to the representational nature of mental
states. They remain uncommitted to any particular account of the representational nature
of mental states, leaving that something to be argued about in philosophy of mind. All the
same, they mention a few popular candidates: functional role theories, informational
theories, and teleological theories.
There are, on their view, significant advantages to taking this General Gricean
viewpoint. For one, it has a certain sort of simplicity to it. By explaining all representation
in terms of the fundamental representations of mental states, we do not need to give wildly
different explanations as to why a scientific model represents its target and why, for
example, a green light represents ‘go’ to a driver. Each occurs because, in virtue of what
the scientist or “hearer” knows, a certain mental state will be activated which contains with
it the relevant representational content.
They can also explain the reasons why similarity or isomorphism will be commonly
used (though non-necessary) since these are strong pragmatic tools in helping to better
bring about the relevant mental state with its representational content. This is, as they argue,
clearly one of the reasons why people from Michigan use an upturned left hand to help
them explain the relative location of their hometown--because the upturned left hand is
similar in shape to the shape of Michigan. The reasons why similarity is a useful tool here
are identical to the reasons why similarity would be useful in scientific contexts, because
it will make the relative instance of communication more effective--meaning that the hearer
(or user of a model or scientific representation) will be better able to arrive at the relevant
mental states which represent the target system.
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In short, their view is that while there might be a general philosophical problem of
representation, there is not anything special about scientific practice that makes its stake in
this problem any different from any other field or the general problem. Of course, as they
amusingly note, this passes the buck to the more fundamental question: “Once one has paid
the admittedly hefty one-time fee of supplying a metaphysics of representation for mental
states, further instances of representation become extremely cheap” (Callender and Cohen
2006, 71).
2.5.Critiques of Deflationary/Pragmatic Accounts
These deflationary and pragmatic accounts of representation have not avoided
criticisms of their own. Many of these criticisms are presented as part of the defense of one
of the views over another. For example, Contessa (2011) argues against a purely
denotational account of scientific representation, such as the one seen in Callendar and
Cohen’s ( 2006). As he says, “Whereas denotation seems to be a necessary condition for
epistemic representation, it does not, however, seem to be a sufficient condition” (Contessa
2011, 125). As Contessa argues, it is insufficient merely to be able to stipulate a
denotational relationship to have the sort of representation which is useful to scientists. For
example, we might use any given equation (e.g. F=ma) to denote the relationship which
holds between the size of predator and prey populations. But, while this equation could
successfully denote this relationship, it will not be of much use to scientists because they
will not be able to draw many insights about the predator-prey relationship. Therefore,
Contessa argues, while denotation is a necessary condition of representation, it cannot
alone be the whole story. In addition, he suggests the need for interpretation in terms of the
target, as described above.
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Matthias Frisch (Frisch 2015, 296–304) has raised a worry which he addressed
specifically to van Fraassen’s (2008) account, but which is applicable to many of the
pragmatic and deflationary accounts described above. The worry is that if we take van
Fraassen’s Hauptsatz (“There is no representation except in the sense that some things are
used, made, or taken, to represent things thus and so” (Van Fraassen 2008, 23)) literally,
then it seems to be impossible that some models can represent. Taking Frisch’s example,
say we wanted to construct a quantum mechanical model of a macroscopic body of water.
To do this, “we would have to solve the Schrödinger equation for on the order of 10 25
variables—something that is simply impossible to do in practice” (Frisch 2015, 297). But
if this is so, then it turns out that that the Schrödinger equation cannot be used to represent
a macroscopic body of water—since we could never use the equation in this way, it is not
representational in this way. Notice that this concern applies to other pragmatic and
deflationary accounts: if we are unable to make inferences or interpret the source in terms
of the target (which, given the complexity here, it seems we would not be able to do), then
it will also fail to be representational on these other accounts. But this leads to a fairly
strong conclusion that we can only use a model to represent a system once we have actually
applied the model to that system. For example, the Lotka-Volterra model seems to only
represent those systems for which scientists have used it; it does not represent all predatorprey relationships, in general.
Frisch does not think that this argument is ultimately fatal to the pragmatic accounts
since he argues that because there are constraints on the use of models which are part of
the scientific practice, there is a sense in which the Lotka-Volterra model, for example,
represents all predator-prey relationships (even though it has not yet been used in this way)
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(Frisch 2015, 301–4). There is no problem in extending models “horizontally,” i.e. to other
instances which are in the same domain of validity of the model. There is, Frisch argues, a
problem in extending models “vertically,” i.e. using a model to represent some phenomena
which is outside the domain of validity. This can be seen in the quantum mechanics
example from above since we do not have any practice in place to use Schrödinger
equations to describe macroscopic bodies of water. So, he claims, van Fraassen’s view
(and, by extension, the other pragmatic and deflationary views) must be committed to an
anti-foundationalism (a view that the sciences cannot be reduced to one foundational
theory) that denies that the models of quantum mechanics can adequately represent
macroscopic phenomena. Of course, the anti-foundationalist commitments might be
viewed as a desirable feature of these views, rather than a flaw, depending upon other
commitments.
Another important critique which applies more generically to a number of these
deflationary and pragmatic views comes from Chakravartty (2010). As described above,
many of those who argue for a deflationary or pragmatic account of representation offer
their view as an alternative to the substantive accounts. That is to say, they deny that
scientific representation is adequately described by the substantive accounts and do not
merely add to these accounts, but rather reject them and offer their deflationary or
pragmatic account instead. Chakravartty argues that this is a mistaken move. We should
not think of deflationary or pragmatic accounts as alternatives to the substantive accounts,
but rather as compliments. On the deflationary or pragmatic accounts, representation
occurs when inferences can be made about the target in virtue of the source. But, “how,
one might wonder, could such practices be facilitated successfully, were it not for some
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sort of similarity between the representation and the thing it represents—is it a miracle?”
(Chakravartty 2010, 201). That is to say, the very function which proponents of the
deflationary or pragmatic accounts take to be the central explainer of scientific
representation seems to require some sort of similarity or isomorphism (Bueno and French
2011). On Chakravartty’s view, the pragmatic or deflationary accounts go too far in
eliminating the role for some substantive feature. In doing so, they leave an important part
of scientific representation behind.
3. Model-Based Representation
The question of scientific representation has received important attention in the
context of scientific modeling. There is a vast literature on models, and much of it is at
least tangentially related to the questions of representation. An examination of this
literature provides an opportunity to see other sorts of insights with regard to representation
and the relationship between the world and representational objects.
3.1. Models as Representations (and More)
Much of the literature on models focuses on the various roles of models within
scientific practice, both representational and others. In an influential volume on models,
Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (Morgan and Morrison 1999b) use a number of
examples of models to defend the view that models are partially independent from theories
and data and function as instruments of scientific investigation. We can learn from models
due to their representational features. Morrison and Morgan start out by focusing on the
construction of models. Models, on their account, are constructed by combining and mixing
a range of disparate elements. Some of the elements will be theoretical and some will be
empirical, that is, from the data or phenomena. Thus far, this view is mostly in line with
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what has been discussed in the above sections. What makes models unique in their
construction is that they often involve other outside elements. These can be stories (ways
of explaining some unexpected data which are not part of a theory), other times it is a sort
of structure which is imposed onto the data. These other elements, they argue, give models
a sort of partial independence or autonomy. This is true even when the outside elements
are not as obviously present, for example when a model is an idealized, simplified, or
approximated version of a theory. This independence is crucial if we are to use them to
help understand both theories and data as we often use them to do.
According to Morrison and Morgan, models function like tools or instruments for
a number of purposes. There are three main classifications of the uses of models. The first
is in interacting with theories: models can be used to explore a theory or to make usable a
theory which is otherwise unusable. They can also be used to help understand and explore
areas for which we do not yet have a theory. Other times, the models are themselves the
objects of experimentation. The second classification of the use of models is in
measurement: not only as a way of structuring and presenting measurements, but they can
also function directly as instruments of measurement. Finally, models are useful when
designing and creating technology.
Models are not valuable only insofar as they have these functions. Models,
Morrison and Morgan argue, are also importantly representational. Their representational
value relies in part on the way in which they are constructed with both the theory and the
data or phenomena. Models can represent theories, data, or can be representational
instruments which mediate between data and theory. Whatever the case, representation, on
their view, is not taken to be some mirroring or direct correspondence between the model
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and its representational target. Instead, “a representation is seen as a kind of rendering--a
partial representation that either abstracts from, or translates into another form, the real
nature of the system or theory, or one that is capable of embodying on a portion of a
system” (Morgan and Morrison 1999b, 27). Sometimes models can be used to represent
non-existent or otherwise inaccessible theories, as they claim is the case with simulations.
The final role of models described by Morrison and Morgan is the way that models
afford the possibility of learning. Sometimes the learning comes in the construction of the
model. Most frequently, though, we can learn using models by using and manipulating
them. In doing so, we can learn because the models have the other features already
described: the wide range of sources for construction, the functions, and their status as
representations. Oftentimes, the learning takes place internal to the model. In these cases,
the model serves as what they call a representative rather than a representation. With
representatives, the insights we can gain from manipulating the model are all about the
model itself. But in doing so, we come to a place from which we can better understand
other systems, both real-world systems and other systems. Other times, we take the world
into the model and then manipulate the world inside the model, as a sort of experiment.
Daniela Bailer-Jones (Bailer-Jones 2003, 2009) defends a slightly different but
related account of the representational nature of models. On her account, models entail
certain propositions about the target of the model. As propositions, they are subject to being
true or false. One way of thinking about the representation of models is to say that models
are representational insofar as their entailed propositions are true. However, this cannot be
exactly right, since, as was mentioned above, models oftentimes intentionally entail false
propositions. Since models are about those aspects of a phenomenon which are selected,

50

they will fail to say things about other aspects of a phenomenon. In some cases, the
propositions entailed may be true for one aspect but false for another. This calls for the role
of model users who decide what function the model has, the ways in which and degree to
which the model can be inaccurate, and which aspects of the phenomenon are actually
representing. In sum, on her view, models are representational in part due to their entailed
propositions, but also due to the role of the model users.
Tarja Knuuttila (2005, 2011) has argued that in thinking about models, too much
emphasis has been placed on their representational features – even in accounting for their
epistemic value. Following and expanding on Morrison and Morgan (Morgan and
Morrison 1999b), she argues that we should think of models as being material epistemic
artefacts, i.e. “intentionally constructed things that are materialized in some medium and
used in our epistemic endeavors in a multitude of ways” (Knuuttila 2005, 1266). The key
to their epistemic functioning is to be found from their constrained and experimental
nature. Models, according to this account, are constrained by their construction in such a
way that they make certain scientific problems more accessible, and amenable to a
systematic treatment. This is one of the main roles of idealizations, simplifications, and
approximations. On the other hand, the representational means used also impose their own
constraints on modeling. The representational modes and media through which models are
constructed (e.g. diagrams, pictures, scale models, symbols, language) all afford and limit
scientific reasoning in their different ways. When considered in this respect, Knuuttila
argues, we can see that models have far more than mere representational capacities
including that they are themselves the targets of experimentation and can be thought of as
creating a sort of conceptual parallel reality.
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3.2. Model-Building
In addressing model-building Weisberg (2007b) and Godfrey-Smith (2006) both
take up the idea that the characteristic way in which models are constructed is indirect.
This comes about in a three step process in which a scientist first constructs a model, then
analyzes and refines the model, and finally examines the relationship between the model
and the world (Weisberg 2007b, 209). Models are used and understood by scientists with
“construals” of the model (Godfrey-Smith 2006). The construal, on Weisberg’s account, is
made of four parts. The first is an assignment which identifies various parts of the model
to the phenomena being investigated. The second part of a construal is the scope, which
tells us which aspects of the phenomena are being modeled. The final two parts of the
construal are each fidelity criteria. One of these is the dynamical fidelity criteria, which
identifies a sort of error tolerance of the predictions of the model. The other is the
representational fidelity criteria, which give standards for understanding whether the model
gives the right predictions for the right reasons, i.e. whether or not the model is linking up
to the causal structure which explains the aspects of the phenomenon being modeled.
This strategy of model-based science is contrasted with a different sort of strategy,
what Weisberg calls abstract direct representation. Abstract direct representation is the
strategy of science in which study of the world is unmediated by models. He gives the
example of Mendelev’s development of the periodic table of elements. This process did
not begin with a hypothetical abstract model which is refined and then used
representationally (as Weisberg thinks the process of model-based science proceeds).
Instead, this process starts with the phenomena and abstracts away to more general features.
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Such distinction between modelling and abstract direct representation underlines the
possibility that not all scientific representations need to achieved in same ways.
There are some worries about Weisberg’s understanding of the process of modelmaking Through a close examination of the development of the Lotka-Volterra model,
Knuuttila and Loettgers argue that the process of model-building often begins with certain
sorts of templates, or characteristic ways of modeling some phenomena, typically adopted
from other fields. Such already familiar modeling methods and forms offer the modeler a
sort of scaffolding upon which they can imagine and describe the target system. They also
argue that another distinct feature of model-making is its outcome-orientation. That is, in
developing a model, a scientist will typically do so with an eye to the anticipated insights
or features of the target system that they wish to represent. Thus, on their view, the modeler
pays close attention to the target system or empirical questions in all stages of the
development of the model (not just at the end, as Weisberg suggests).
3.3. Idealization
One of the important discussions that has developed primarily in the literature on
models concerns idealization. Weisberg argues that there are three different kinds of
idealization, which he generically describes as “the intentional introduction of distortion
into scientific theories” (2007a, 639). The first kind of idealization he calls Galilean
idealization. This is the sort of idealization in which a theory or model is intentionally
distorted so as to make the theory or model simpler, in order to render it computationally
tractable. This sort of idealization occurs when scientists ignore certain features of a system
or theory, not because they are playing no role in what actually happens, but rather because
including them makes the application of the theory or model so complex that they cannot
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gain traction on the problem. By removing these complexities, scientists distort their model
(because it lacks complexities which reflect the target). But after gaining some initial
computational tractability, they can slowly reintroduce the complexities and thus remove
the distortions.
The second type of idealization is what Weisberg calls minimalist idealization. In
a minimalist idealization, the only features that are carried into the model or theory are
those causal features which make a difference to the outcomes. So, if some feature of a
target can be left behind without losing predictive power, a minimalist idealization will
leave that feature behind. As an example, Weisberg notes that when explaining Boyle’s
law, it is often assumed that there are no collisions between gas molecules. This is, in fact,
false since collisions between gas molecules are known to take place in low-pressure
gasses. But, “low pressure gases behave as if there were no collisions” (2007a, 643). So,
since these collisions do not make any difference to our understanding of this system,
scientists can (and do) leave this fact behind.
Notice that this is distinct from Galilean idealization insofar as minimalist
idealizations leave certain features out of their theories or models because they make no
difference to the relevant tasks or goals at hand. Galilean idealization, on the other hand,
leaves certain features out even when they do make a difference, simply because leaving
them in would make the model more complex and less tractable.
The final sort of idealization described by Weisberg is what he calls multiplemodels idealization. This is the practice of using a number of different, often incompatible
models to represent or understand some phenomenon. In this case, none of the models by
itself is capable of accurately modeling the relevant target system. All the same, each of
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the models is good at representing certain features of the target system. Thus, by using not
just a single model but rather this group of models, each of which is distorted, scientists
can get a better sense of the target system. Weisberg offers a helpful example: the National
Weather Service uses a number of different models in making its weather forecasts. Each
of the models used represents the target in a different way, each being inaccurate in some
way or another. It is the use of all of these models that permits forecasts of higher accuracy
since attempts to make a single model have resulted in less accurate predictions.
4. Sociology of Science
4.1.Representation and Scientific Practice
Many important insights on the nature of scientific representation have come not
from the philosophy of science but rather from thinkers who would typically be considered
part of the field of sociology of science. The insights from this field can serve as both a
source of insight on the nature of representation in scientific practice, as well as a challenge
to the primarily epistemically-oriented insights from the philosophy of science. Michael
Lynch and Steve Woolgar (1990) edited an important collection of papers on scientific
representation in practice written from the perspective of sociology of science. More
recently, Lynch and Woolgar edited another collection with Catelijne Coopmans and Janet
Vertesi (Coopmans et al. 2014). Treating representation from the perspective of sociology
of science involves asking a different sort of question than the one so far addressed in this
article. Instead of asking about the constitution of scientific representation, sociologists of
science are more interested in a different question, “What do the participants, in this case,
treat as representation?” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 11). In the introduction to this volume,
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Lynch and Woolgar provide a general overview of some of the important insights from this
perspective.
Since sociology of science treats scientific practice as its object of inquiry, it is keen
to describe precisely how representations are actually used by scientists. They note the
importance of “the heterogeneity of representational order” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 2).
That is, there is a wide range of devices which are representational as well as a wide range
of ways in which the representations are used and in which they are useful. Importantly,
sociologists are often interested in discussing more than merely the epistemic or
informational role and use of representations, viewing them as significantly social,
contextualized, and otherwise embedded in a complex set of activities and practices.
Sociologists of science attempt to pay attention to the whole gamut of representations and
representational uses to better understand precisely the role they play within scientific
investigation.
Another important insight, Lynch and Woolgar note, is that the relation between
representations is not to be thought of as directional in the sense that the representations
move from or towards some “originary reality” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8). Instead, any
directionality of representations is to be thought of as “movement of an assembly line”
(Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8). That is to say, representational practice must be seen as
constructing not only a representation, but also (re)constructing a phenomenon in a way so
that it can be represented. This is something that can be seen in much of the literature from
sociologists of science, including the work of Latour as I describe in greater detail below.
In paying close attention to the way representations are actually used, some
sociologists of science note settings in which “discrepancies between representations of
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practice and the practices using (and composing) such representations” (Lynch and
Woolgar 1990, 9). These discrepancies and other problems encountered in the actual
practice of science allow for improvisation and creativity which can help advance the
particular domains of which they are a part. Sociologists of science are interested in
studying this creativity, not only for its productivity in science, but also as an interesting
phenomenon in its own right.
4.2. Circulating Reference
A particularly telling example of these insights, especially from the philosophical
point of view, is provided in Bruno Latour’s “Circulating Reference” (Latour 1999).
Latour’s photo-philosophical case study is based on the work of a group of scientists who
were examining the relationship between a savannah and forest ecosystem. At the end of
their project, they collectively published a paper on their findings which included a figure
of the interaction between the ecosystems, detailing the change in soil composition among
other features. Latour asks how it is that this abstract drawing, which takes a perspective
no individual could possibly have had and which ignores so many of the features of the
ecosystem, can be about that stretch of land. That is to say, here we have a drawing,
something made by ink and paper, and there we have the forest-savannah ecosystem, how
is it that the former can be about the latter?
Latour’s method of answer, which takes the form of a strikingly well-written case
study in which he presents pictures from the expedition which he uses to structure and
represent the process he describes, is to look carefully at all the details and steps by which
the scientists got from the expedition to the figure in the paper. What happens, says Latour,
is that there are a series of steps through which the scientists abstract from the world in
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some intentional fashion. In doing so, they maintain some relevant feature of the world,
but they are simultaneously constructing the phenomena they are studying. In the process
the representations produced are also getting more abstract.
An example will make this clearer. At one stage in the process, soil samples are
collected from a vertical stretch of ground. These samples are transferred into a device
which allows the whole vertical stretch of earth to be viewed synoptically. In taking the
sample, the scientist has already begun to construct--already this particular bit of dirt is
taken to be representative of the dirt for a much wider area of land. Once the soil has been
collected, various features of the soil are maintained through intentional actions on the part
of the scientist. For example, the scientists will label the soil as being of a certain sort of
consistency. The scientists then use a clever device in which there are pinholes in a tool
which has the various Munsell colors and numbers, which is itself a construction with a
long history. In looking through the pinholes, the scientist can abstract away from the dirt
sample itself, taking, in some sense, only the color (which is done in virtue of a construction
of numbers associated with particular colors). Something has clearly been lost, namely, the
full materiality of the dirt. But something has also been gained, in this case, a number which
corresponds to the color of the dirt; some usable, manipulatable data.
Latour’s essay carefully describes many of these transitions from the savannahforest system to the published figure. As he claims, it is this series of transitions (which
each involve abstraction and construction due to the intentional decisions of a scientist)
which ensures that the figure at the end references or represents the savannah-forest system.
There is not a single gap between the figure and the world which must be accounted for by
some representational relation. Instead, on his account, there is a large series of gaps, each
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of which is crossed by a scientist's actions in abstracting and maintaining, constructing and
discovering. This series, he thinks, can be extended infinitely in either direction. By
abstracting further from the already quite-abstract figure, certain hypotheses might be
suggested, which would result in a return to the savannah-forest system, to gather data
which might be more basic than the data already gathered. On his view, there is no such
thing as “the world” which is the most basic thing-in-itself; nor is there any most-abstracted
element.
4.3. Critiques of Sociology of Science
While these insights from the sociology of science literature have been both sources
of support and criticism for the philosophical literature, they have also been subject to
criticisms. One important criticism comes from Giere’s (1994) review of Lynch and
Woolgar’s (1990) Representation in Scientific Practice. Giere’s primary target is the
extremely constructivist nature of the sociology of science literature. The constructivist
approach claims that science is socially constructed: i.e., science is filled with sociallydependent knowledge and aimed at understanding socially-constructed objects. There is no
such thing, on this view, of a non-constructed world to be understood by scientists, and
therefore, no such world to be represented. The attempt to explain representation in this
framework results in a “no representation theory of representation” (Giere 1994, 115). But,
Giere thinks there is a straightforward counter-slogan to a view of this sort: “no
representation without representation” (1994, 115). That is to say that if there is nothing
‘out there’ in the world being represented, it cannot be that this is an instance of
representation. This is not to reject the importance of paying attention to the role of the
practices and representational devices in particular case studies. All the same, Giere argues
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that if we want a general account of scientific representation, “we must also go beyond the
historical cases” ( 1994, 119). Put otherwise, the sociology of science perspective is an
important part of explaining scientific representation, but this work by itself leaves
representation unexplained.
Knuuttila (2014) takes up a similar line of criticism. While she places great
importance on the insights of sociologists of science, she thinks that many of their views
have developed with a false target in mind. Many sociologists of science place their views
as a contrast to a traditional philosophical view of science as something which perfectly
represents the world. The alternative, they suggest, is their constructivist approach, as
described above. However, Knuuttila argues, this motivation runs into a few problems.
First, when they select certain practices to investigate rather than others, by what criterion
are they distinguishing this practice as representational? In doing so, they seem to be
relying on some traditional account of representation to delineate the cases of interest.
Further, it seems that these studies do not show that representation is a defunct concept and
that we are bound to a purely constructivist account of science. Instead, “these cases
actually reveal…what a complicated phenomenon scientific representation is…and give us
clues as to how, through the laborious art of representing, scientists are seeking and gaining
new knowledge” (Knuuttila 2014, 304). We need not think that just because there is not
perfect representation of the world, that there is therefore no world to be represented. Their
insights could equally contribute to an intermediate view in which we reject this perfectrepresentation view of science, but still maintain that science is giving us knowledge of the
real world. That is, we can simultaneously deny that representations “are some kind of
transparent imprints of reality with a single determinable relationship to their targets” while
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still affirming that the “artificial features of scientific representations…result from wellmotivated epistemic strategies that in fact enable scientists to know more about their
objects” (Knuuttila 2014, 304).
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CHAPTER 3
THERE IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC
REPRESENTATION 4
1. Introduction
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by
Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen ( 2006), who argue that representation is the same
across disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of
scientific representation unexplained. To explain how scientific representation is
dependent upon practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of
representational vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists
in accord with broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature
of representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific
representation.
2. Callender and Cohen’s View
On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific
representation has been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 27).5 Specifically, they think
there is no reason for philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution
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Boesch, B. (2017) There is a special problem of scientific representation. Philosophy of Science,
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Romina Zuppone (2014) argues in favor of Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, suggesting that there are
normative but not substantive or constitutive differences in representation between art and science.
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question:” “What constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?”
(Callender and Cohen 2006, 68). In response to this question, they make a few
observations. One is that it is “economical and natural to explain some types of
representation in terms of other, more basic types of representation” (Callender and Cohen
2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of how “entities
other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent the very
same targets that models represent” (Callender and Cohen 2006, 71). For these reasons,
they suggest that “scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative
representation” (Callender and Cohen 2006, 75). That is to say that the representational
nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the same way that the representational nature
of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In each case, and in every practice, the
representational nature in question will be reduced to a more fundamental representational
entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a painting, and a scientific model will
each be explained in terms of the representational nature of mental states.
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which
delimit scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints
are delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not
a part of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the
utility of these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that
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are representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se”
(Callender and Cohen 2006, 75).
If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there
is something special about representation in science.6 As one example among many,
Mauricio Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His
account takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation
(what he calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be
a scientific representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows
competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (Suárez
2004, 773). If we accept Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many
others like it do nothing more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies
employed in delimiting representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation
In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not
been addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender
and Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation,
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consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:7
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and
attributes some connection between X and Y.
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of jasmine can be
reminiscent of golfing, and so on.
There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational
nature of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental
entities. For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of
the mental state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it).
Second, stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could
draw a symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to call my nephew.
The reminiscent relationship between the symbol and my nephew exists because of my
stipulative act. Finally, any limitations of reminiscent relationships will be made for
pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol
on my hand look like the ball from his favorite sport since it will more easily remind me
of him.
These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and
Cohen’s perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the
particular aims for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different
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aims alone are insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation
and reminiscence: while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is
necessarily communal. That reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that
discussions of reminiscence can terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is
ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not a drawing is reminiscent of my nephew. This is
because reminiscence is agent-relative and so depends only upon some particular agent and
her mental states.
Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued,
“representation is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’,
and more particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried
out by those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling”
(2010, 99). Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is
embedded. It is necessarily communal.8 The communal nature is demonstrated from the
fact that representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and
their mental states.9 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra
model (which represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to
genetic drift does not count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only
because it does not (pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it
ignores and discounts the autonomous elements of the model as understood and developed
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scientists’ mental states.

66

by the broader scientific community. 10 The autonomous elements are seen in the materiality
or historicity of the representational vehicle; in its development, reception, and
contemporary use. Understanding how and why the scientific object represents its target
requires paying attention to these communal features.11 That is to say that the communal
features are partially constitutive of the representational relationship. Callender and
Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently account for these
constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below.
4. Licensing
Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention
be given to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms
of its development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a
vehicle and its target. It is through licensing that scientists and the broader scientific
community establish what Suárez calls the “intended representational uses” of a vehicle
(2004, 768). Licensing is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship:
it plays a critical role in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing
the sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the
representational relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical
development, reception, and use of actual instances of scientific representations.
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67

4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass
on the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be of use in drawing an analogy to
licensing in science.12 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an
example. The mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of
cyberbullying is clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how
Guernica is representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s
intentions within the environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was
received by viewers in the years following its creation, and how it is understood today.
With these features in mind, it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of
the people of Guernica who had been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco
Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. The licensing here is a constitutive element of
Guernica’s representational nature: without these features, it is not clear whether or how
the painting would manage to represent anything at all.
Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the
author Flannery O’Connor: [A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the
significance of the Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant,
but finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head” (1988, 853). The Misfit
is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” and,
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as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly representational. Her
answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational target for the hat, there
may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her authorial intent, but
rather due to the views of the broader artistic community.
Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means
of licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as
if Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of
Picasso, audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding
why it represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that
there may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate
one. A single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the
target must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes
as understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts
are a critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat.
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study
The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is
of a different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical
role in establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of
scientific representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a
laborious art” (2014, 304). Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the
complexities of scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the
complicated features seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any
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type of representational vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made
by Bruno Latour (1999). I will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its
development exhibits interesting features, many of which have already been widely
discussed by other philosophers (e.g. Knuuttila and Loettgers 2012, 2016).
As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different
scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of
this model, it is important to pay attention to its licensing through its historical
development. This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of
the model by Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and
empirical aims. These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development
reveal the partial autonomy of its representational nature. These features make up the
licensing which is itself partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model
since understanding how and why the model represents its targets requires attending to
these features. Let us now turn to examine these features in more detail.
Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by
the goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in
fishery statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 19). His aim to address a theoretical
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the
model historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider
how Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description: “Let us
seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: afterwards let us
translate these words into mathematical language. This leads to the formulation of
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differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be guided by the methods of analysis
we are led much farther than the language and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry
us and can formulate precise mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of
observation. Rather the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical
results” (Volterra 1928, 5).
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of
results (for both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to
account for the population change of a single species. He then added additional species and
modelled interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the
same food and the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he
demonstrated “three fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living
together” (1928, 20). He then applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to
the empirical case which had prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator
populations during the decrease of fishing of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during
World War I (1928, 21).
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War
I? It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature.
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (2016), the historical development of this
model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two papers
in which he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target not
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by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive construction
of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical contexts and
can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets because
Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent?
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra:
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he
developed a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling
various kinds of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 13). He began by creating a very
general equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among
the several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 15). In two papers
(1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question.
For example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there
would be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations
(Lotka 1920a, 414). Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but
instead used his results to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which
he then connected to theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First
Principles (1920a, 414).
Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he
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applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is
constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey
relationships. Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the
general equation and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to
specific targets. In so doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the
model—he licenses it as a representation through activities in accord with the broader
practice.
The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and
complex. As such, the licensing of the model goes beyond the initial work of Lotka and
Volterra—similar to how the licensing of O’Connor’s story goes beyond her initial work.
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the
use of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey
ratios rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time,
was the use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death
for the prey. Each of these developments license new representational targets by expanding
and altering the model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by
removing idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions.
Many other variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments.
As just one example, Richard Goodwin (1967) modified the model to apply to questions in
economics. Additionally, the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory
textbooks on ecology (see, e.g., Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational
nature of the model in each of these cases is partially established by these features of the
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model which stand independent of any mental states of scientists and students alike.
Scientists do not merely start using a model however they would like, without recourse to
the history of the use of the model. There are autonomous elements of the model which are
carried with it when it changes contexts in virtue of how it was originally developed and
how the broader scientific practice has come to use and understand it over time (Knuuttila
and Loettgers 2014). In short, the constitution of the representational nature of the LotkaVolterra model relies deeply upon these historical features of licensing as understood by
the broader scientific community.
Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose
that they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that
it represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It
is not as if the star really is a scientific representation, albeit a bad one, of predator-prey
relations. Rather, the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Indeed, Yann
Giraud’s (2014) study of the Laffer Curve in economics reveals that bad scientific
representations still include significant elements of what I have called licensing. Scientific
representations, good and bad, are all constructed to assist in answering certain questions,
explaining certain phenomena, and understanding certain target systems. It is through
licensing that scientists and the broader scientific community build into and around the
vehicle the features and interpretations capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without
licensing lacks these features and interpretations. As such, it is not just a bad representation;
indeed, it is not a representation at all. A discussion of the representational nature of
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vehicles which lack these features is either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the
word ‘representation.’ A view of scientific representation which equally counts both the
star and the Lotka-Volterra model as full scientific representations, even if it specifies one
as good and one as bad, underestimates the role of these historical features of the model.
They are not external to the representational nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an
essential constitutive element of its representational nature: without these features, the
vehicle is not a scientific representation at all.
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation
If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific
representation which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s
suggestion, we cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from
questions of practice. A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is
some stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in
which it was created, the application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness
of and management of idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting
for whether and how a scientific object represents its target will always require reference
to these features which partially establish the representational nature. Thus, there is a
special problem of scientific representation.
I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender
and Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are
without any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument
does indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is
insufficient to account for scientific representation. Put otherwise: even if tomorrow we
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had a solid, universally accepted account of the representational nature of mental states,
we would not yet have a complete account of scientific representation. We would still need
an account of the deep reliance that it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus,
while our discussion of the constitution of scientific representation might include reference
to the representational nature of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have
described here as the licensing by the practice.
A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I
have identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a
common feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested
that it holds of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my
argument, an account of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well,
it does not indicate that it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the
unique aims that mark off scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be
correspondingly unique. That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the
empirical world are special aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing.
Scientific representation remains special because these features merit special attention.
We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific
representation as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that
we understand the way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these
representational devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different
within different domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might
be rather different from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad
scale aims of the various domains, we can still say some general things about representation
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in science as a whole. Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as
it occurs in these more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop
further insights about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific
representational objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking
hints and clues from in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of
science, e.g. those in Lynch and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al.
(2014).
6. Conclusion
Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the
constitution question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show
why their account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by
philosophers of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in
which it is embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the
way that science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities
of licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve
reference to licensing. Thus, there is a special problem of scientific representation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MEANS-END ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC,
REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIONS
1. Introduction
In the past fifteen years, there has been an increased interest among philosophers
of science in discussing the nature of representation as it is used within scientific practice
(Boesch 2015; Suárez 2015b; Frigg and Nguyen 2016a). Over time, a significant number
of philosophers have shifted their focus away from substantive accounts of scientific
representation which refer to the features of representational vehicles and their targets and
instead offer pragmatic accounts of scientific representation which focus more heavily
upon the actions of users of representational vehicles. Apart from avoiding criticisms
raised against substantive accounts, pragmatic accounts of scientific representation can
explain a wide range of representational uses while drawing our attention closer to the
actual practice of science.
Despite these advantages of pragmatic accounts, there has been little said about the
notions of action, intention, and agency being employed by these accounts. Just as one
example among many, Ronald Giere argues that representation occurs when “Agents (1)
intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of world, W; (4) for some purpose, P”
(2010, 269). Though he uses work in the philosophy of language to help explain the
communicative nature of representation, he does not analyze the notions of intention or use
which he employs. Since these agential concepts are playing an important role in his
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account (and, indeed, in all pragmatic accounts), the lack of analysis of these concepts
constitutes a significant gap in our understanding of the representational practices of
science. For this reason, I will turn in this paper to some work within the philosophy of
action, and in particular to an account of the nature of intentional actions, to better
understand the nature of scientific, representational actions.
Given the broad commitments of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation
alongside some guiding suggestions offered by the proponents of these accounts, I will
argue that a suitable account of action can be found in the work of G.E.M. Anscombe
(Anscombe 2000). She argues that intentional actions are marked off from other actions in
virtue of the form of the internal means-end structure of the descriptions of the agent’s
intentional action, which is itself revealed by a particular sort of ‘Why?’ question. After
briefly describing Anscombe’s account of intentional action, I will argue that
representational actions in science can be understood and analyzed in virtue of their internal
means-end structure. What I shall call the Means-End Account of Scientific,
Representational Actions offers three central features: (I) the final description in the meansend ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim; (II) that interaction with a vehicle
distinct from its target stands as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final
description as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is licensed by scientific
practice, in the sense I have previously described (Boesch 2017). After describing each of
these features in greater detail through an example, I show how the Means-End Account
can demarcate scientific, representational actions from representational actions in other
disciplines and from other types of scientific actions. I close by identifying some payoffs
of the Means-End Account: that it offers the first account of the scientific, representational
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actions which ground pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and that it identifies
representation as a form of action which is of use when exploring how representation is
intertwined with other scientific activities.
1. From Dyadic to Triadic Accounts of Scientific Representation: A (Brief) History
To show explicitly the value of turning to the philosophy of action for this topic, it
will be of use to first offer a brief characterization of the history of accounts of scientific
representation. Early accounts of scientific representation were “dyadic” (Knuuttila 2005,
1261), in which scientific representation was understood as a two-place relationship that
holds between some vehicle (e.g. a model) and some target system (e.g. a theoretical or
empirical mechanism). The representational relationship, on dyadic accounts, is explained
in virtue of some more fundamental relationship that holds between the vehicle and
target—most commonly offered in terms of a structure-preserving mapping relationship,
e.g. isomorphism, partial isomorphism, isomorphic embedding, and homomorphism (see,
e.g., Bartels 2006; French and Ladyman 1999; French 2003; Van Fraassen 1980), or a more
general relationship of similarity (e.g., Giere 1988)13 Dyadic accounts of scientific
representation have been subject to several criticisms. As just one example, a prominent
set of criticisms (Suárez 2003; Frigg 2006) follows the work of Nelson Goodman (1976)
and argues that both similarity and isomorphism (and other forms of structure-preserving
mapping relationships) are insufficient accounts of scientific representation, since they do
not have the same logical features as representation.

13

While van Fraassen and Giere have often been interpreted as holding dyadic accounts of scientific
representation in the form of isomorphism and similarity in their early work, Suárez (2004, 768) has pointed
out that they each give importance to the role of a user even in their early work. Van Fraassen agreed with
Suárez’s assessment, arguing that he always left room for pragmatics, and only makes it more explicit later
on (Ladyman et al. 2011, 443–44).
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Partially due to these criticisms, philosophers of science later began to offer
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation.14 Pragmatic accounts are “(at least) triadic”
(Knuuttila 2005, 1261) because their proponents argue that there is an irreducible place for
the agent in the representational relationship. They argue that “what representations are
depends on how we use them” (Knuuttila 2011, 266). I have already noted the central role
for the scientist’s agency, intentions, and use in Giere’s (2010) account. Suárez’s inferential
conception of scientific representation similarly makes an essential reference to “the
presence of agents and the purposes of inquiry” (2004, 773). These accounts are far from
the only ones to give prominence to the agency and use of scientists in offering an account
of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Teller 2001; Bailer-Jones 2003; Suárez 2010,
2015a; Giere 2004; Contessa 2007, 2011; Van Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009).
2. Three Ways Forward from Pragmatic Accounts
In some ways, the shift toward pragmatic accounts of scientific representation
makes it difficult to offer any further insights about scientific representation. At least some
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation deflate the concept of representation
entirely to use. Deflationary accounts of representation imply that “the analysis of the
concept of representation, even where feasible, cannot determine its conditions of
application, and therefore cannot explain its use” (Suárez 2015a, 47). It is unclear what
further insights can be offered by an account which cannot describe when and how
representations will be used within scientific practice. Even for those pragmatic accounts

14

Other alternatives to a substantive account include denying that there is any such thing as representation in
science, suggesting that instead there is a mere family of resemblance of a set of practices (e.g., Lynch and
Woolgar 1990). Giere (1994) and Knuuttila (2014) criticize this ‘no-representation’ approach. Another
alternative is to offer an account of representation which applies to all disciplines in which it is found. Craig
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (Callender and Cohen 2006) make such an argument in terms of internal
mental states. For a criticism of this account, see my response to their work (Boesch 2017).
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which maintain substantive elements in addition to a foundation in human actions
embedded in a practice, there remains a concern that little more can be said about the
pragmatic grounding of these accounts. As Tarja Knuuttila has put it: “if representation is
grounded primarily in the specific goals and the representing activity of humans as opposed
to the properties of the representative vehicle and its target, nothing very substantial can be
said about it in general” (2009, 144). Nonetheless, there are still several ways forward
which jointly help to make general progress in better understanding the practice of
representation within science.
One way forward is to begin by acknowledging the essentially pragmatic nature of
scientific representation, but then turn to examine and describe the more fundamental
features and relationships which are frequently utilized when scientists represent. These
more fundamental relationships are what Suárez (2003, 229) calls the “means” of
representation—while representing scientists take advantage of these features, they are
alone insufficient to explain the representational relationship. These include things like
similarity (e.g., Giere 2004, 2010; Weisberg 2013), as well as other structure-preserving
mapping relationships (Bartels 2006; Bueno and French 2011; Frisch 2015; Van Fraassen
2008). These studies are insightful and useful in understanding some instances and means
of representational use since they can help draw our attention to some of the strategies and
features that scientists use.
Another way forward, suggested by Suárez (Suárez 2015a, 47), is to pay more
attention to the uses of representational vehicles in practice. Practical studies of classes of
representational vehicles attend not to the more fundamental relationships being utilized in
representational activities, but to the classes of representational vehicles which scientists
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construct, revise, and employ. Interesting and insightful studies have been made about
various classes of vehicles, including models (Morgan and Morrison 1999a; Knuuttila
2005, 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Weisberg 2007b; Knuuttila and Loettgers 2012, 2014,
2016) and other representational vehicles like diagrams and figures (e.g. Woody 2004;
Perini 2005a, 2005b; Sheredos et al. 2013). Similarly, sociologists of science have done
many useful studies examining the development and employment of some particular
representational vehicle (e.g., Lynch and Woolgar 1990; Latour 1999; Coopmans et al.
2014). Studies of representational vehicles are of obvious value to deepening our
understanding of the uses of scientific representation since they draw our attention to the
ways in which classes of vehicles or specific instances of representation are utilized within
practice.
There is a third way forward which, so far, has not yet been discussed by
philosophers of science. It is to pay greater attention to the nature of agency which is central
to pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and offer an account of scientific,
representational actions. Many accounts indeed do offer some insight into what sorts of
actions they have in mind. Van Fraassen, for example, speaks of using, making, and taking
something as a representation in his famous Hauptsatz or central point about the nature of
representation (2008, 23). Suárez (2004)(2004) speaks of the surrogate inferences that are
made with regard to the target system being represented. And Giere (2004, 2010) speaks,
as I mentioned above, about an agent’s intentions and use. Despite the insights which have
arisen from these accounts of using, making, taking, inference-making, intending, and so
on, nothing has been said about the nature of the actions themselves with regard to their
internal structure. Put differently, what is the nature of the action being performed when a
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scientist uses, makes, takes (etc.) a vehicle as a representation? What are the features and
elements that make up the representational use of a vehicle? Taking up such an inquiry
requires offering and working through an account of the nature of actions, working to apply
the account to the representational practices in science so as to analyze the nature of
scientific, representational actions.
In this paper, I will follow this third way forward, getting behind the references to
using, making, taking, and so on to examine the internal structure of scientific,
representational actions. My argument will speak generally about scientific,
representational actions as a whole. The generality of my account will leave several
elements unspecified, since as Knuuttila notes, we must proceed forward from pragmatic
accounts in a way which leaves room for the “specific goals” taken up in the activity of the
scientists (2009, 144). The account defended here will leave room for the specific goals a
scientist might take up by offering a general account of some of the formal, internal features
of the intentional actions of representing in science. Before I offer and defend an account
of the nature of scientific, representational actions it will be of use to turn first to some
work on the nature of intentional actions drawn from philosophers of action.
3. Desiderata of an Account of Scientific, Representational Actions
There are numerous accounts of the nature of agency and intentional actions within
the philosophy of action. Before diving into the literature in greater detail, it is of use to
first identify general features of the notion of agency as it is being utilized in pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation. The most helpful insights are two related claims, one
negative and one positive, about the relationship between representational use and mental
states: (1) that representational actions are not explained in terms of internal, individual
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mental states and (2) that representational actions are to be explained in terms of the wider
scientific practice.
Let us examine these in greater detail. Suárez is explicit in denying that
“representation is necessarily the property of individuals… [or that] representation is ‘in
the head’” (Ladyman et al. 2011, 432; c.f. Suárez 2010, 98–99). If we are to have a truly
pragmatic account of representation in science, Suárez argues that we must avoid “[a]n
intentionality conception [of scientific representation which] … takes it that sources and
targets are determined by some intentional state of some particular agent or agents,
regardless of community, practice, and indeed any intended or unintended uses” (Ladyman
et al. 2011, 432). He argues that an account which reduces representation to the singular
intentions or mental states of some individual misses the important role that the broader
scientific practice and community plays in scientific representation. Indeed, on Suárez’s
view, scientific representation is not ‘in the head’ but rather “‘in the world’, and more
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez
2010, 99).
Following Suárez’s work, I have recently argued that scientific representation is
“necessarily communal” insofar as it “is not isolated from the practice in which it is
embedded” (Boesch 2017, §3). Scientific representations, I argue, are ‘licensed’, i.e.
established as representational by the broader scientific practice. Licensing is a complex
“set of activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational
relationship between a vehicle and its target” (Boesch 2017, §4) and includes elements like
“the context in which [the vehicle] was created, the application of theoretical and empirical
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constraints, the awareness of and management of idealizations, and the history of its
reception and use” (Boesch 2017, §5). My point is that if you are going to understand how,
why, and in virtue of what some vehicle is a representation in science, you cannot ignore
its history, its development, and how it is understood and used by the broader scientific
practice. Put more directly to the concerns at hand, an account of scientific representation
must move beyond individual mental states and consider the broader practice in which
representational actions are embedded.
4. Anscombe’s Account of Action
In selecting an account of action for the purposes at hand, it will be important that
we follow the suggestions above to identify an account which pays attention to the broader
circumstances and does not terminate in discussions about mental states. There are
therefore reasons to shy away from the standard causal account which argues that actions
are intentional in virtue of being caused by particular sorts of mental states (see, e.g.,
Davidson 2001). Such an account turns our attention inward to mental states, rather than
outward to the circumstances and society in which an action occurs. Furthermore, the
relevant mental states occur before the action actually takes place, meaning that “the
subsequent ‘effects’—i.e., the actual performance or doing, is simply a matter of nature
taking its course” (Frey 2013, 4). As Harry Frankfurt argues, the causal account thereby
“direct[s] attention exclusively away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away
from the times at which they occur” (Frankfurt 1998, 70). Frankfurt’s criticism is
particularly relevant given that we are attempting to offer an account of scientific,
representational actions as they occur within the context of scientific practice, not of the
mental states which precede these actions. As such, we will need a different account of
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action which pays closer attention to the actual action itself and which helps to show the
way in which an action is embedded in a wider practice.
G.E.M. Anscombe (Anscombe 2000) developed an account of intentional action
which agrees with the basic point that actions are not intentional because of private, internal
mental states. She is quite clear on this point, arguing that “intention is never a performance
in the mind” (Anscombe 2000, 49). Instead, she argues that an investigation into intention
must begin with the actions themselves: “The only events to consider are intentional actions
themselves, and to call an action intentional is to say it is intentional under some description
that we give (or could give) of it” (Anscombe 2000, 49). Put otherwise, the term
‘intentional’ does not have reference to a connection to internal mental states, but instead,
“the term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events” (Anscombe 2000,
84). There is not room to discuss her account in much detail, but a brief overview of a few
features will be of use in what follows.
To understand what Anscombe means by the ‘form of description of events’, we
must first get clear on a few key concepts. An action, she argues, can be described in several
accurate ways. Consider a simple action, like when I get a refill on my cup of coffee as a
reward and encouragement to finish a paper. It can be described as ‘getting a refill,’ ‘tipping
a coffee pot,’ ‘activating certain neurons, neural regions, and nerves,’ ‘rewarding myself
for finishing a section on my paper,’ (if there is a crack in my mug) ‘making a mess,’ and
so on. We can distinguish between these descriptions through the application or nonapplication of “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’” (Anscombe 2000, 84). The
application or non-application of the ‘Why?’ question can be seen in the coffee refill
example. Some of these descriptions are such that when asked why I am doing the thing
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described by that description, I will offer an answer—they are such that I will not refuse
the ‘Why?’ question. So, for example, if you ask me ‘Why are you getting a refill?,’ I will
accept the application of the question when I respond, e.g., that I am rewarding myself for
finishing a section on my paper. However, you may also ask about descriptions to which I
refuse application of the ‘Why?’ question (Anscombe 2000, 84). For example, if you ask,
‘Why are you making a mess?” I may deny the application of the question by saying that I
did not know that I was doing so. Genuine lack of awareness is one way that someone can
deny the application of the ‘Why?’ question. Others include descriptions of something
involuntary (e.g. activating certain neurons, since we cannot voluntarily activate specific
neurons) as well as things which are ‘downstream’ from our action such that we cannot say
that the agent is doing them now (e.g. getting tenure, since at the end of writing the paper
I will not have tenure, even though the paper may very well ultimately contribute to my
getting tenure).
Suppose that, in the coffee example, there are three descriptions to which the
‘Why?’ question applies: (A) ‘Tipping the coffee pot;’ (B) ‘Getting a refill;’ and (C)
‘Rewarding myself for finishing a section.’ Anscombe argues that these descriptions have
a unique formal connection to one another which is central to explaining the intentional
nature of the action. Consider the following series of ‘Why?’ questions and answers:
Why are you (A) tipping the coffee pot?
(B) To get a refill.
Why are you (B) getting a refill?
(C) To reward myself for finishing a section.15

15

You could of course ask why I am doing (C). But at a certain point, the answer to this question is too far
‘downstream,’ as the example of ‘getting tenure’ shows (Anscombe 2000, 38–40).
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There are two important things to notice about this example. First, Anscombe thinks that it
is important that (A) is a means to the end of (B), and (B) is a means to the end of (C). That
is to say that the reason or purpose in tipping the coffee pot is to get a refill, and the reason
or purpose of getting a refill is to reward my hard work. Second, it is important to notice
that (A) - (C) are not separate actions, but rather separate descriptions of one and the same
action. In these contexts and circumstances, with the mug under the coffee pot (which is
itself full of coffee), tipping the coffee pot is getting a refill, not a step toward getting a
refill. Similarly, getting a refill is rewarding myself, not a step toward rewarding myself.16
We are now in a position to see what Anscombe means when she says that “the
term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events” (Anscombe 2000, 84).
The form is an internal means-end structure, in which the multiple accepted descriptions
of one and the same action are ordered as means to ends. So, the intentional nature of an
action has very little to do with internal mental states and instead has everything to do with
the structure of the descriptions of the actions—which is itself understood within the
broader context of the action since the contexts and circumstances (that the mug is under
the coffee pot, that the coffee pot is full, etc.) are key in making it such that an earlier
description (e.g. (A) tipping the coffee pot) is the same action as a later description (e.g.
(B) getting a refill).
Furthermore, Anscombe argues that the broader context plays a central role in the
agent’s practical reasoning which itself reveals “what good, what use, the action is”
(Anscombe 2005, 114). So, to understand how and why an action is intentional, we must

16

This depends a bit on what I assume the reward to be. I am assuming it is the refill of the mug (and not
drinking the coffee) because I often count a refill a reward and do not then drink from it. If you find this
contentious, you can consider Anscombe’s more detailed water pump example (Anscombe 2000, 37) which
is not subject to the same ambiguities.
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understand the aims of the action and how the contexts and circumstances connect certain
descriptions accepted by the agent. So, for example, understanding how refilling coffee
was intentional involves understanding my aims (rewarding myself), our society (that
coffee is a desirable drink) and how the circumstances connect the descriptions—that the
coffee pot is full, that the mug is under the coffee pot, that it is not leaking, and so on, are
essential conditions to making it such that tipping the coffee pot (in this case) is an instance
of refilling my mug.
So, if we are going to understand the nature of scientific, representational actions
as intentional actions in the Anscombean sense, we will need to pay careful attention to the
form of the scientist’s action (the way in which descriptions are ordered as means to ends),
the aims of the scientist (why she is representing—“what good, what use, the action is”
(Anscombe 2005, 114)) as well as the circumstances in which she is acting, since these
play a central role in structuring the form of the action.
5. The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational Actions
There are two important demarcation projects in offering an account of scientific,
representational actions. The first is to explain in virtue of what the actions are scientific,
representational actions, i.e. how they are different from representational actions in other
contexts. The second demarcation project is to offer an account of how the actions differ
from other scientific actions, i.e. how the actions are scientific, representational actions.
Each of these demarcation tasks will be conducted in terms of the “form of description of
events” (Anscombe 2000, 84). Here, I will offer what I call the Means-End Account of
Scientific, Representational Actions in which there are three features which hold of the
form of the action which can jointly address the two demarcation questions and offer
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insights into the nature of the representational practices in science: (I) the final description
in the means-end ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim (e.g. scientific explanation,
prediction, theorizing, etc.); (II) that interaction with a vehicle distinct from its target (e.g.
a mathematical model, diagram, figure, etc.) stands as an earlier description which is
ordered toward the final description as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is
licensed by scientific practice, as I have previously described (Boesch 2017).
6.1 Three Features of Scientific, Representational Actions
Before describing how these features which hold of the internal means-end
structure of scientific, representational actions can answer the two demarcation questions
and offer insights about scientific, representational actions, it will be useful to spend some
time explaining each of the features and describing them in greater detail. A running
example will be of use during this stage, so let us consider a scientist who is using a
mathematical model as a representation of some target system, e.g. a scientist who uses the
Lotka-Volterra equations to represent the population dynamics of a predator-prey system
of foxes and rabbits. What is going on when the scientist uses the equations in this way?
Like the example of getting a coffee refill above, there are several ways to describe her
action. She could be described as ‘writing down numbers,’ ‘manipulating an equation,’
‘analyzing dynamical features of the equation,’ ‘coming to an understanding of the
dynamics of populations resulting from predator-prey interactions,’ ‘shaking the table,’ and
so on. As before, some of these descriptions will be denied the application of Anscombe’s
‘Why?’ question: for example, perhaps she does not know she is shaking the table and so
would deny this description of her action. Let us suppose that she accepts three of these
descriptions of her action, offered in the following imagined series of ‘Why?’ questions
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and her replies to those questions. As before, the use of the ‘Why?’ question helps to reveal
how these descriptions are all of one and the same action and ordered as means to ends.
‘Why are you writing down numbers?’
‘I am writing the equation in different ways.’
‘Why are you writing the equation in different ways?’
‘I want to analyze its dynamical features.’
‘Why are you analyzing the equation’s dynamical features?’
‘I want to understand the population dynamics which result from the foxes’
predation upon rabbits.’
Each representational action will have its own set of descriptions which may vary due to
user, aim, or vehicle. But, assuming that each case of representational action is an
intentional action, it will be subject to the same sort of analysis as above. The Means-End
Account of Scientific, Representational Actions identifies the general features that will
hold of the action’s internal structure.
Using the example, consider the first part of the Means-End Account: (I) the final
description in the means-end ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim (e.g. scientific
explanation, prediction, theorizing, etc.).17 In this example, the final description
(understanding the fox-rabbit population) clearly counts as a scientific aim. Other scientific
aims include, but are not limited to, things like scientific explanation, experimentation,
theorization, prediction, alongside nonepistemic aims, including things like mitigation or
practical implementation (Elliott and McKaughan 2014). I do not mean to offer a full and

Note carefully that the multiple describability of actions, on Anscombe’s account means that there are
many ways to describe any given action, but this does not further imply that either (1) every action has
multiple aims in its descriptions nor that (2) the descriptions are purely arbitrary.
17
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complete list of the potential scientific aims that can be present in scientific,
representational actions. While the aims are in most cases easily identifiable, the only
requirement is that the aim be recognized or accepted by the broader scientific community
as a scientific aim.18 Thus, for example, suppose that the scientist in the example above
was writing the equation in different ways because she realized that the pencil scratches
matched the beat of her favorite song. Such an aim is patently non-scientific. The same is
true if she is writing the equation in different ways as part of a piece of art she is making.
The final description must be one which her fellow scientists would count as scientific.
It is also worthwhile noting that the aims of the scientific, representational action
also supply a standard of normative evaluation for the action. Insofar as a scientist achieves
her aims, her representational action can be considered successful. An action might be
successful with regard to some aims and unsuccessful with regard to others. Given the wide
range of aims allowed by the Means-End Account, there is room to understand a similarly
wide range of normative measures of evaluation, including accuracy, predictive success,
explanatory power, among others. The Means-End Account remains uncommitted to which
normative standards and measures might apply in any given representational action, except
that they must be understood in the context of the scientist’s aims. So, certain
representational actions might take accuracy or correspondence as a normative measure of
success, likely (though not exclusively) when the goals include knowing, understanding,
or predicting. Such is the case, for example, with the representational actions involving
scale-models, e.g. the Mississippi River Basin Model. Accuracy (in at least some respects)

18

I make this point to avoid offering normative restrictions on scientific practice, especially as it changes and
evolves going forward. I take it that the scientific community at any given stage will be the best judge (even
if fallible) of what counts as a scientific aim.
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in the construction and use of the model allows for more useful predictions and a better
understanding of the dynamics of floods in the Mississippi River Basin. There are other
cases where accuracy or correspondence will neither be a success or a failure of a
representational action. Such is the case for models of systems which do not exist—for
example in attempting to understand the evolution of sex by studying non-existent
biological species with three sexes (Weisberg 2007b, 223). Here, there is no value to
correspondence (since there could be no correspondence), though there is a value to
explanatory power.
The second feature of scientific, representational actions is (II) that interaction with
a vehicle distinct from its target (e.g. a mathematical model, diagram, figure, etc.) stands
as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final description as means to end. In
the Lotka-Volterra model, there were two earlier descriptions of interaction with the
vehicle: writing the equation in different ways and analyzing the dynamical features of the
equation. The relevant sense of ‘interaction’ in the second feature is meant to be left open,
and includes things like analyzing an equation, writing an equation down, tracing fingers
along a chart, examining and considering different parts of a diagram, altering variables in
a simulation, and so on. As was the case with the relevant sense of scientific aims, it is
important only that the form of interaction be recognizably useful in a scientific context by
the broader scientific community. Minimally, the scientific community’s recognition will
involve a reasonable expectation that the form of interaction will accomplish some
scientific aim. Thus, for example, the scientist’s throwing of a crumpled piece of paper
with the Lotka-Volterra equations printed on it is not a valid form of scientific interaction
with the model since it would not help to accomplish any scientific aims.
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It is important to note that the vehicle with which the scientist interacts must be
distinct from its target. The purpose of this requirement is to incorporate the idea that
representation is a non-reflexive relationship, meaning that any given vehicle does not
represent itself (at least not for representation as it occurs within scientific practice). What
counts as distinct for the purposes of the Means-End Account includes not only separate
objects (e.g. a scale model to a river valley, a mathematical equation to a theoretical
system), but also different perspectives on the same object. For example, interactions with
a few model organisms (e.g. these three mice) can be used to draw conclusions about the
broader species or sub-species to which they belong (e.g. Mus musculus or C57BL/6).
Similarly, interaction with this sample of lead (if it is a representative sample) can be used
to understand general features about lead as a whole. The distinction in both examples is
sufficient to meet the requirement as explained by the Means-End Account.
The third and final feature of scientific, representational actions is (III) the meansend structure is licensed by scientific practice, in the sense I have previously described
(Boesch 2017). As I described above, a representation is licensed through a complex “set
of activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational
relationship between a vehicle and its target” (Boesch 2017, §4), including “the context in
which [the vehicle] was created, the application of theoretical and empirical constraints,
the awareness of and management of idealizations, and the history of its reception and use”
(Boesch 2017, §5). Here, I am extending the notion of licensing to include the scientific,
representational actions which undergird scientific representation. For actions, what
matters is that the means-end structure itself be licensed; i.e. that the means is an accepted
form of accomplishing the end. So, in the example above, analyzing the dynamical features
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of the Lotka-Volterra model is a licensed means of better understanding the relationship
between predators and prey, including the specific fox-rabbit population at hand. However,
suppose that the scientist was analyzing the dynamical features of the model but was
aiming to understand the radioactive decay of some isotope of carbon. In such a case, while
both her aim and means are scientific, the relationship between the means and the end is
not licensed by the scientific community since the Lotka-Volterra model is not used to
represent radioactive decay. 19
Bruno Latour (1999) has effectively described many of the elements of what I call
licensing in the construction and development of a diagram. Latour describes in meticulous
detail the many minute steps by which scientists move and abstract away from the target
system of forest-savannah interaction in the construction of a diagram which represents
that system. The task involves, for example, dividing the land into sections, sampling soil,
describing colors, taking plant samples, and drawing many iterations of the diagram before
it is completed. The use of the diagram as a means to gaining understanding or creating
explanation about the forest-savannah system is, on my account, licensed by these many
activities on the part of scientists which, as Latour so carefully describes, are themselves
subject to the aims, norms, and theory of scientific practice. The same is true for the
relationship between other representational vehicles as means and certain aims and goals:
the mouse, as a model organism, is licensed to allow for certain tentative conclusions to be
made about the efficacy and safety of human consumption of some pharmaceuticals; the
Mississippi River model was licensed to make predictions about floods and the mitigation
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In some cases, representational vehicles will be used in novel ways (e.g. in the transfer of a model between
disciplines). In such a case, the licensing of the representational action is given through the scientist’s
application of theoretical and empirical constraints to her action (for more on this point, see Boesch 2017).
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provided by the implementation of proposed flood-control systems in the river basin;
Schelling’s model is licensed as a means of providing a potential explanation of the types
of societal habits which can lead to segregation; and so on and so forth.
6.2 The Demarcation of Scientific, Representational Actions
As identified above, there are two main ways in which scientific, representational
actions need to be demarcated from other sorts of actions: (1) in virtue of what are they
scientific, representational actions? and (2) in virtue of what are they scientific,
representational actions? The Means-End Account addresses each of these demarcation
questions.
Let us consider first what makes these actions scientific. The answer here is to be
found in all three parts of the Means-End account. Both the action’s aim offered in its final
description and its means offered in an earlier description must be accepted as scientific by
the broader scientific community. Furthermore, the connection between the means and the
end is itself licensed by scientific practice. While representational actions in other
disciplines (e.g. art) might utilize similar means and similar ends, they nonetheless are
distinguished in virtue of being part of a different practice, constituted by a different set of
aims, means, and set of licensing practices (Boesch 2017). On the Means-End Account, an
action is scientific when it is informed and constrained by the practice of science, much in
the same way that an action is a viable chess move when it is informed and constrained by
the rules and practice of the game of chess. Some move, e.g. ‘Castling’, is a chess move in
virtue of its relationship to the external rules of the game of chess and an understanding of
its strategies and the practices that have arisen alongside the game. For the same reason, a
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representational action is scientific in virtue of its relationship to the external practice of
science.
Of course, there are a wide range of scientific actions beyond only representation.
The Means-End Account must help also to demarcate scientific, representational actions
from other sorts of scientific actions. The central point of demarcation is that actions
described by the Means-End Account have denotational form. Denotational form is drawn
from the notion of denotation, the standing-in of a representational vehicle for its target.
Nelson Goodman, whose work on representation is often cited in discussions of scientific
representation, argues that “denotation is the core of representation” (Goodman 1976, 5).
Several philosophers of science have similarly argued that denotation is an important part
of an account of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Elgin 2010; Frigg and Nguyen
2016b). The Means-End Account does not make reference to a relationship of denotation
that holds between the vehicle and the target, but rather makes reference to the denotational
form that holds of the scientist’s action. Denotational form holds when an agent uses some
vehicle as a stand-in for a target. Formally, this is present when there is one action with at
least two descriptions (ordered as means to ends) in which the earlier description involves
interaction with a vehicle and a later description involves the (potential) achievement of
some end about the target. The Means-End Account describes actions which have
denotational form, since features (I) and (II) require two different descriptions, one of an
end to (potentially) achieve some aim about the target and the other of a means of
interacting with the vehicle (which is distinct from the target found in the end).
There are two important caveats to the notion of denotational form. The first is that
denotation is a non-reflexive relationship. Thus, denotational form must incorporate the
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non-reflexivity, meaning there must be a distinction between the vehicle in the first
description and the target in the second. However, as is the case with the Means-End
Account, even a difference in perspective is sufficient to account for the necessary level of
distinction (e.g. it is sufficiently distinct if interaction with these three mice allows for
conclusions to be drawn about Mus musculus as a whole). The second important caveat
about denotational form is that it relies upon a deflated notion of denotation, what Suárez
describes as “denotative function” (Suárez 2015a, 44). A vehicle has denotative function
provided it is the sort of thing which would denote its target, supposing that its target exists.
The modification to the notion of denotation is useful for an account of scientific
representation since it helps to explain how it is that vehicles with fictional targets are still
representations. For the purposes of the Means-End Account, it helps to explain how it is
that an action can have denotational form, even if the aims involve (potential) achievements
about a fictional target system.
The denotational form of a scientific action demarcates it from other forms of
scientific action. Non-representational experimentation does involve scientific interaction
with something and a scientific aim, but it does not have denotational form because it lacks
distinction between the object of the interaction and the object of the aim. So, for example,
an experiment designed to identify an unknown chemical lacks denotational form because
the interaction occurs directly with the unknown chemical. Conclusions about the object
of interaction (the unknown chemical) are not generalized to be about a broader species,
but are instead about the unknown chemical itself.
Of course, there are plenty of cases of experimentation (and other forms of
scientific action) which do have denotational form. But this is because representation is
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deeply intertwined with many different forms of activities in science. As just one example,
representation is a common element to many types of experimental design. Thus,
experimental actions which have denotational form have it because the experimental
method involves representation. So, for example, a public health experiment which uses a
sample of some population to draw conclusions about the value of some health protocol
utilizes representation as an essential feature of its design. The experimental design is such
that the sample population is a representation of the larger population. Indeed, much of the
work in experimental design in such cases is involved with obtaining a representative
sample and collecting data which allows the scientists to show others that the sample is a
meaningful representation of the larger population—both constituting the licensing in such
a case. The denotational form of the action in this case points to the representational nature
of the action, even if it is also a form of experimentation. Indeed, as I will discuss below,
the Means-End Account is useful in helping to identify the ways in which representational
actions can be brought into and united with other forms of actions in science, even while
providing the tools by which we can identify what makes a representational action in
science distinct from a non-representational action.
6.3 Payoffs of the Means-End Account
Before examining some of the payoffs of the Means-End Account, it is important
to pause and summarize what the account does and does not do. The Means-End Account
does not offer an account of the nature of scientific representation. As such, it is not able
to explain new cases of representation which other accounts could not explain. It begins
with the assumption that some pragmatic account or group of accounts has already
provided a good analysis of the nature and use of representation in scientific practice.

100

Following on this assumption, it offers an analysis of a component which has been
heretofore unexamined: the nature of the actions that undergird and ground representation
for these accounts. The Means-End Account does not, therefore, explain how some model
represents its target, though it does explain what it means to say that it is used
representationally by some agent working in the context of scientific practice. The MeansEnd Account offers an account of the actions “carried out by those communities of
inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99).
The first payoff of the Means-End Account follows upon the very fact that it
describes not the nature of scientific representation, but rather the nature of scientific,
representational actions. Because it takes a different target for its analysis, the Means-End
Account provides novel insights for our understanding of the important practice of
representation in science. Whereas pragmatic accounts of scientific representation have
terminated their discussion of actions by describing using, taking, making, inferencemaking, and so on, the Means-End Account gets to a deeper level by offering an analysis
of the agential concepts from an action-theoretic perspective. It describes the conditions
which hold of the internal structure of representational actions in science. Such an account
is useful for a few reasons. One is that it offers a stronger theoretical ground for pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation, by filling in some of the undescribed details about the
nature of the agency which grounds these accounts—for example, by explicating the
relationship between normative standards and the context of use. It can also be of use in
analyzing instances of representational use associated with particular vehicles and
particular aims. For example, when analyzing the representational use of some diagram,
the Means-End Account can be of use in analyzing the representational action, specifically

101

with regard to how the action in this case differs from the scientific and representational
actions in other cases. Most importantly, though, is that the Means-End Account offers a
significant step forward in an attempt to gain a more complete grasp of the practice of
representation within science. A more complete account of the practice of representation
in science will explain not only the nature of scientific representation, but also the strategies
and features scientists use (e.g. similarity and other structure-preserving mapping
relationships), the classes of representational vehicles used and particular case studies, and,
now, with the Means-End Account, the nature of scientific, representational actions.
As I mentioned above, the Means-End Account can be of use in understanding how
other forms of scientific activities (like experimentation) utilize representation, since it
points to the way in which representation is deeply intertwined with other scientific
activities. According to Anscombe, there are two ways we might think of a single action
with multiple descriptions. One of these recognizes that each description is a full
characterization of the action and can be used to describe the action as a whole. The
alternative way of understanding an action with multiple descriptions is to recognize that
there is a particular eminence to the final term in the series of descriptions. As Anscombe
says, “the last term we give in such a series…so to speak swallows up all the preceding
intentions” (Anscombe 2000, 46). So, if we are going to offer one and only one description
of an action, the most proper description is the final description of the internal means-end
structure. According to feature (I) of the Means-End Account, all scientific,
representational actions take as their final description some scientific aim (e.g. explaining,
understanding, knowing, predicting, etc.). As such, successful instances of scientific
representation are not merely cases of representation, full stop. Indeed, there is no such
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thing as successful scientific representation which is not also properly describable as some
other scientific activity, as an instance of understanding, knowing, explaining, predicting,
exploring, discovering, and so on.
The reason for the intricate connection between representation and other scientific
activities is connected to the way in which the Means-End Account understands
representational actions of science in terms of their form. On the Means-End Account,
representational actions occur when an action best characterized by its final description
(e.g. explanation, prediction, etc.) meets certain formal requirements regarding the ordering
of descriptions and the relationship between them. As such, representation takes on an
‘adverbial’ function within scientific practice: scientists understand representationally,
explain representationally, discover representationally, experiment representationally,
and so on. On the Means-End Account, then, representation turns out to be one of the ways
in which the many types of scientific activities occur.
There are a couple of useful consequences to this final insight about scientific,
representational actions, each of which could be more fruitfully explored in future work.
For one, it suggests that there may be interesting forms of strategies associated with
representational forms of certain types of activities. For example, explaining
representationally might employ certain techniques that discovering representationally
does not employ (and vice versa). It is possible, therefore, that studies of representation
could be classified not in terms of classes of vehicles (e.g. models, simulations, diagrams,
etc.), but rather in terms of classes of activities (e.g. explaining, understanding, predicting,
etc.). Saying anything in detail about these differences will require a closer analysis of the
practices associated with these forms of activity, perhaps including an analysis of case
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studies. The Means-End Account offers the tools to be able to perform such an analysis
which will offer insights about a wide range of scientific practices.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have taken seriously the suggestion offered by a wide number of
philosophers of science in recent years that representation in science must be understood
in terms of a scientist’s agency, actions, and activities. I argued that in order to have a more
complete picture of the practice of representation in science, it is important to offer an
account of scientific, representational actions. Following some guidelines already present
in the literature on scientific representation, I argued that Anscombe’s account of
intentional action has the right sorts of features to be able to fit with the other pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation which have already been offered. Following her
insight that intentional refers to the form of description of events we give to an action, I
argued that scientific, representational actions have three features which help to demarcate
them from other sorts of actions. The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational
Actions contributes to a more thorough picture of the practice of scientific representation,
by offering a novel account of the scientific, representational actions. It also points to the
potential for future work on the way in which representation is intertwined with other forms
of actions in science.
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CHAPTER 5
PRAGMATIC ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION20
1. Introduction
Many recent philosophical accounts of scientific representation are pragmatic in
nature.21

Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are marked off from other

accounts because they give an irreducible place within the representational relationship to
the role of the scientist and her intentional activity. Put otherwise, all pragmatic accounts
are minimally triadic (Knuuttila 2005) insofar as they reference not only the
representational ‘vehicle’ (models, equations, diagrams, etc.) and its representational
‘target’ (real-world systems, data, theoretical objects, etc.), but also include the intentional
actions or ‘intended use’ activities (Suárez 2004) of a scientist or group of scientists.
Pragmatic accounts have much to suggest for themselves qua philosophical
explanations of scientific representation. For one, they are not subject to the same sorts of
criticisms that have been levied by Mauricio Suárez (2003) and Roman Frigg (2006)
against alternative dyadic or two-place accounts (e.g. similarity and isomorphism).22
Furthermore, both Suárez (2003) and Frigg (2006) argue that pragmatic accounts are better
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Boesch, B. Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation: A tapestry of explanation. Under review at
Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
21
For an overview of the literature on scientific representation, see (Boesch 2015; Suárez 2015b; Frigg and
Nguyen 2016a).
22
Defenses of isomorphism or partial isomorphism are given by van Fraassen (1980), French and Ladyman
(1999), French (2003), Bartels (2006), Bueno and French (2011), among others; defenses of similarity are
given by Giere (1988) and Weisberg (2013). For a response to the objections of Suárez (2003) and Frigg
(2006), see Chakravartty (2010), Bueno and French (2011) and Toon (2012).
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able to deal with intentional misrepresentations, allowing them to better explain the use of
a wide range of representational devices within the varied domains of scientific practice.
For this reason, it is not surprising to see so many pragmatic accounts developed and
defended in recent years, including RIG Hughes’ (1997) DDI account, Mauricio Suárez’s
(2004) inferential account, among many others (Teller 2001; Bailer-Jones 2003; Giere
2004, 2010, Contessa 2007, 2011, Knuuttila 2005, 2011; Van Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009;
Frisch 2014).
What is more surprising is the variation that exists between pragmatic accounts of
scientific representation. While there appears to be agreement that representation is
grounded in human action, there is no similar agreement about how this is to be cashed out,
in terms of the analysis of scientific representation. Within pragmatic accounts of scientific
representation, we find references to denotation, demonstration, and interpretation (Hughes
1997), representational force and surrogative reasoning (Suárez 2004), a scientist’s
intending to use a vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes (Giere 2004), and a
scientist’s using, making, and taking (Van Fraassen 2008), just to name a few. What are
we to make of these variations? Do differences in terms represent a difference in analysis
of representation? Call this puzzle the question of external unity of pragmatic accounts of
scientific representation.
One answer to the question of external unity is to suggest that there is a substantial
difference between these accounts. That, e.g., reference to denotation, demonstration, and
interpretation is substantially different from reference to a scientist’s intentions to use a
vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes. If this is the case, then there would be
a conflict between the many pragmatic accounts: to accept one would be to reject the others.
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For anyone seeking to analyze an instance of scientific representation, much would hang
upon precisely which account taken. Of course, such a response would help to explain the
proliferation of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, since, on this
interpretation, each offers its own distinct view of the representational relationship. All the
same, it is not clear what the relevant difference is between an account which references a
scientist’s intending to use a vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes and one
which references denotation, demonstration, and interpretation.
A different answer to the question of external unity, and the one which I will defend
in this paper, argues that pragmatic accounts are complementary with one another. I will
argue that the many pragmatic accounts offer a tapestry of explanation through which we
can understand the complex practice of representation in science. Each account takes up a
different focus and places stronger emphasis on different elements within the activity of
representing. In different ways and to different extents, accounts highlight the role of ends
and aims in representing, or the interaction with the vehicles and their features, or the
translation that occurs between vehicle and target. Representation in science, I will suggest,
is a complex and varied practice and cannot be quickly and succinctly understood. Thus,
the myriad of pragmatic accounts constitutes a tapestry of explanation by which we can
better understand the nature of representational practice in science through drawing our
attention to the many important elements of representational activities.
To argue that the many pragmatic accounts offer a tapestry of explanation of
scientific representation, we must turn to understand the nature of the common element
which undergirds pragmatic accounts: the irreducible reference to the agency of the
representing scientist. Using an account of the nature of intentional actions offered by
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G.E.M. Anscombe (2000), I show that any given intentional action can be described in a
number of ways. The difference in description does not indicate a difference in action, but
rather a difference in how the action is understood and characterized. A similar point holds
true for pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. Each offers a different set of
descriptions of the scientific representation which holds in virtue of the representing
actions of the scientist. The differences do not indicate a fundamental point of disagreement
between proponents of pragmatic accounts, but rather demonstrate a difference in form of
description of the representational relationship which is grounded in their actions. Put
differently, in any given instance of scientific representation, there is a single
representational relationship, which holds in virtue of a single representing action. The
many pragmatic accounts of scientific

representation merely offer different

characterizations of the representing action and the representational relationship that holds
because of it.
1.

Two Pragmatic Accounts of Scientific Representation
While the analysis that follows is applicable to all accounts of scientific

representation which are grounded in action, it will be helpful to defend it in terms of
particular and concrete examples, so as to show specifically how it applies to the accounts
in question. I will begin by describing two prominent pragmatic accounts: Hughes’ (1997)
DDI Account and Suárez’s (2004) Inferential Account.
2.1. Hughes’ DDI Account
Hughes’ (1997) DDI account describes scientific representation with reference to
three features: denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. That is to say that a scientist
represents by performing an activity in which she denotes, demonstrates, and interprets.
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The first of these features, denotation, is the way in which a scientist uses a representational
vehicle as a stand-in for the target system (Hughes 1997, S329-S331). According to
Hughes, denotation is a broad term meant to include things like the denotation of concrete
particulars (e.g. a model of the solar system will denote particular planets), the denotation
of specific types (e.g. Bohr’s theory models not just one hydrogen atom, but all hydrogen
atoms), and the denotation of a model of some global theory, e.g. this particular model is
“represented as a quantum system” (Hughes 1997, S331). Common among each type of
denotation is the notion of ‘standing-in’: in each case, the representational vehicle is
serving as a stand-in for something else.
Denotation or standing-in is insufficient by itself for an account of representation
in science, since we must also pay attention to the particular ways in which these
representations are used within the practice to bring about certain results and show how
these results hold of our target system. The second part of Hughes’ DDI account is
demonstration, the feature which explains how certain results are brought about (1997,
S331-S332). In order to allow for demonstrations, it must be the case that representational
vehicles “contain resources which enable us to demonstrate the results we are interested
in” (Hughes 1997, S332). So, for example, a physical model of a protein will allow us
(through manipulation of the parts of the model) to see what sorts of configurations allow
for connections or separations between the various parts of the model. Similarly, the
mathematical parts of the Lotka-Volterra model will allow the scientist to identify the
simple harmonic motion it identifies. Notice that in both cases, the demonstrated results
are discussed entirely in terms of the model. For Hughes, demonstration occurs when a
scientist shows that there are certain features which hold of the representational vehicle
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which allow her to demonstrate results (e.g., make predictions, identify trends, analyze
connections, and so on) which themselves hold of the representational vehicle itself.
Of course, representation in science must not stop with inferences about the
mathematics (or whatever feature of the representational vehicle). Scientific representation
must show that the demonstrated results do not hold only of the vehicle, but that they
connect and inform scientists about the real world or theoretical targets. As such, Hughes
offers a final element in his DDI model: interpretation (1997, S332-S335). Interpretation
takes the scientists from the vehicle back and returns her to consideration of the target. In
interpretation, the demonstrated results (predictions, trends, connections, etc.) are taken to
hold of the target as well. So, for example, the scientist interprets her results as informing
her not only of the plastic model of the protein, but about the actual stability of the
configuration of the protein in the real world. Similarly, the Lotka-Volterra model is
understood to demonstrate simple harmonic motion not only for the dynamical equation,
but also for the simple harmonic changes in population sizes for a group of predators and
prey in virtue of their predator-prey interactions.
Before moving on to describe Suárez’s inferential account, it is important to pause
for just a moment and point out that the three features of the DDI account are understood
by Hughes as “three activities” (1997, S329). That is to say that Hughes is not ultimately
describing his account in terms of the features of representational vehicles, but in terms of
the activities done by scientists. Of course, neither I nor Hughes is suggesting that
representational vehicles are without important features which offer affordances for the
activities of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. All the same, Hughes is clear
that, for the DDI account, scientific representation is grounded in the activities scientists
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conduct with the vehicles rather than the features of the vehicles. Scientific representation
is a practice in which a scientist takes some vehicle to denote some target, demonstrates
certain results which hold of the vehicle, and finally interprets those results to bear upon
her understanding (or explanation or knowledge) of the target system.
2.2. Suárez’s Inferential Account
The second account which I wish to examine in greater detail is Suárez’s (2004)
inferential account.23 Suárez understands scientific representation in virtue of two features.
The first of these features is what he calls representational force, defined as “the capacity
of a source to lead a competent and informed user to a consideration of the target” (Suárez
2004, 768).24 Representational force carries with it not only the denotative function, insofar
as a scientist uses the vehicle as a stand-in for its target, but also an important place for the
rules and norms of the practice. The need for representational force does not imply that a
vehicle must serve as a stand-in for anyone who uses the vehicle, but rather for the
“competent and informed user” (Suárez 2004, 768). All the same, one of the important
elements of representation in science is the vehicle’s pointing-towards its target, which is
described by Suárez as representational force. So, for example, the representational force
of the physical model of the protein points towards the real-world protein (or the theoretical
structure of that protein). Similarly, the Lotka-Volterra model, when used by a competent
and informed user, point to the relationship between populations of predators and prey.
As Suárez argues, representational force alone will not suffice for representation in
science. Scientific representation is objective insofar as it is constrained by the aims of
understanding, explaining, or knowing the target system and by the scientific practice in

23
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Suárez offers further details about his inferential account elsewhere (Suárez 2010, 2015a).
N.B. Suárez uses the term ‘source’ where I use the term ‘vehicle’.
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which the representation is embedded.25 As such, representational vehicles must also have
the second feature, what Suárez calls “the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning” (2004,
773). That is to say that when informed and competent scientists use the representational
vehicle, they will not only be led to consider the target system, but to draw specific sorts
of inferences with regard to those targets. Suárez is not particular about whether the
inferences are instances of understanding, or explaining, or knowing, since he argues that
the relevant sorts of inferences can be the result of “any type of reasoning…as long as [the
source] is the vehicle of reasoning that leads an agent to draw inferences regard [the target]”
(2004, 773). Scientists do not represent because they merely need to be reminded of the
targets or because they simply need to be led to consider the target system. Scientists
represent because they want to make inferences about the target—to know more about the
system, to better explain some causal relationship, to better understand some relationship,
etc. The capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning captures this important feature of
scientific representation. So, for example, the physical model of the protein will not only
direct a scientist to consider the real-world protein, but will also be such that she can draw
inferences about the stability of some configuration of the real-world protein. Similarly,
the Lotka-Volterra model does not exist only to help scientists draw predator-prey
relationships to mind, but also to help them draw specific sorts of inferences and insights
about that relationship.
As was the case with Hughes’ DDI account, it is important to pause for just a
moment to explain that Suárez also takes his account to describe conditions of the
representational activities performed by scientists in accord with a practice. Indeed, Suárez
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For more on the relationship between a representation and the broader community, see (Boesch 2017).
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has explicitly stated that representational force and the capacity to allow for surrogate
reasoning are properties of activities: “[W]hen appropriately placed in their context, [the
two parts] are best understood to appropriately refer to properties of particular activities
within a normative practice” (Suárez 2015a, 42). According to Suárez’s inferential account,
scientific representation occurs when a scientist performs activities which have certain
features: moving from consideration of the vehicle to consideration of the target
(representational force) and using the vehicle to draw certain inferences about the target
(the capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning).
2. A Turn to the Philosophy of Action
In order to understand how these and other pragmatic accounts are related to one
another, we will need to understand the nature of the common feature which unites them:
the irreducible role of the actions of a scientist. Though other accounts could be used, there
are advantages to using the account of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe.
Most importantly, her account allows us to understand the way in which an action is
embedded in a practice and denies that we can understand intentional action in terms of
mental states. These features are central elements of the actions that undergird pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation, according to Suárez (2010) and my prior work
(Boesch 2017).
Anscombe argues that intentional actions are marked off from non-intentional
actions because they are those “actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is
given application” (Anscombe 2000, 9). The relevant sense of the ‘Why?’ question is “that
in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe 2000, 9). So, for
example, we can ask why an agent is doing some description of her action. If she answers

113

the question positively, she allows application of the question, showing the description to
be an intentional description of the action. To better understand this, consider Anscombe’s
famous water pump example:
A man is pumping water into a cistern which supplies the drinking water of
a house. Someone has found a way of systematically contaminating the
source with a deadly cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until
they can no longer be cured. The house is regularly inhabited by a small
group of party chiefs, with their immediate families, who are in control of a
great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a
world war.—The man who contaminated the source has calculated that if
these people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will
govern well, or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and secure
a good life for all the people; and he has revealed the calculation, together
with the fact about the poison to the man who is pumping. (Anscombe 2000,
37)
There are, of course, a wide range of descriptions we can give to his action. For example,
we might say that he is helping to institute a better government, or that he is replenishing
the water supply, activating certain neural pathways, moving a pump up and down, making
a rhythm to Queen’s “We Will Rock You”, earning his wage, and so on. Through the use
of the ‘Why?’ question, we can narrow down the list to consider “all and only his
intentional actions” (Anscombe 2000, 38).
To understand which set of descriptions characterizes the agent’s intentional
actions, we must first eliminate three general types of descriptions. Each of these types of
descriptions forms a way in which the agent might reject the ‘Why?’ question. First, there
are certain descriptions which would not be countenanced by the agent because she lacks
knowledge or awareness (Anscombe 2000, 11–13). So, for example, if we ask the agent
why he is making the rhythm to Queen’s “We Will Rock You,” he can deny application of
the ‘Why?’ question by explaining that he does not know the song. Since the ‘Why?’
question does not apply, this is not an intentional description of his intentional action. A
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second set of descriptions which are denied application of the ‘Why?’ question are those
which describe an activity which can never be intentional (Anscombe 2000, 11–13). For
example, the agent might reject the description that he is activating certain neural pathways,
since this is not the level at which we can control things. The third set of descriptions which
are excluded from the set of intentional action descriptions are those which are ‘further
downstream’ from the action at hand. These descriptions occur after what Anscombe calls
a “break”: the descriptions for which it “is not such that we can now say” that the agent is
doing the action, e.g. “to save the Jews, to put in the good men, to get the Kingdom of
Heaven on earth” (Anscombe 2000, 40). This is not a good description of the agent’s
intentional action, because it is not what the agent is doing. He, of course, aims to do these
things, and his action may be a vital step in the plan. But in completing the action at hand,
he will not have accomplished the aim. For our purposes, we need not linger any longer on
the descriptions which are excluded, except to note that while any given action has a wide
range of potential valid descriptions, the range is not boundless. It matters what the agent
knows, what she is capable of controlling, and what she is accomplishing in the action at
hand.
Moving on from the rejected descriptions, we can recognize that an intentional
action will have some descriptions which the agent will accept as meaningful responses to
the ‘Why?’ question. For the water pump example, Anscombe suggests that we assume
that there are four: A) He is “moving his arm up and down”; B) He is “operating the pump”;
C) He is “replenishing the water supply”; D) He is “poisoning the inhabitants” (Anscombe
2000, 41). All the same, Anscombe argues that even though there are four separate action
descriptions, we should not suppose that there are four actions, but rather a single action
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which can alternatively be described in four different ways: “moving his arm up and down
with his fingers round the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump; and,
in these circumstances, it is replenishing the house water supply; and, in these
circumstances, it is poisoning the household” (Anscombe 2000, 46).
For the purposes of answering the question of the external unity of pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation, it is important to briefly pause to emphasize that
descriptions A-D are not the only potential descriptions which could have been offered for
the agent’s action. Had we so wished, we could have selected four different descriptions
for the pump example above, e.g., A*) He is pushing and pulling a pump; B*) He is
drawing water from the ground; C*) He is performing his job; D*) He is committing an act
of murder. The exact details of the A*-D* descriptions are not particularly important. What
is important is to note that, A-D are not inherently a better set of descriptions than A*-D*.
Depending on what you attend to in the action, you can offer a different account of the
action descriptions present in an intentional action. Put differently, descriptions A-D and
descriptions A*-D* are equally acceptable means of describing the agent’s actions.
3. Multiple Describability and External Unity
At this stage, we are in a position to be able to put forward an answer to the question
of external unity of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. Consider an example
of the representational use of the Lotka-Volterra model to describe the relationship between
a population of foxes and rabbits. According to Hughes, the model is a representation
because its use involves the three activities of denotation, demonstration, and
interpretation. So, we can imagine a series of hypothetical ‘Why?’ questions asked to the
scientist which follows Hughes pattern:
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Why are you writing down the model?
I’m using it as a stand-in for the fox and rabbit populations.
Why are you using it as a stand-in?
I’m able to manipulate the model to identify mathematical and analytical
features of the model.
Why are you showing mathematical features of the model?
I am interpreting these mathematical features of the model to hold also of
the fox-rabbit population.
The exact nature of the answers might vary, but if they are following the three elements
Hughes had in mind, we might expect them to be something like the above.
The use of Suárez’s Inferential Account will yield a different set of descriptions
and answers to the series of ‘Why?’ questions. We could imagine interrupting our scientist
yet again (hoping she is not too annoyed by our question asking), this time asking questions
and receiving answers with the inferential account in mind:
Why are you writing down the model?
I’m using it to consider the fox-rabbit system.
Why are you considering the fox-rabbit system?
I am drawing inferences about their relative population sizes over time.
As before, the exact descriptions offered with the inferential account in mind may differ.
The question of the external unity of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation
has to do with the relationship that holds between these two ways of describing one and
the instance of representing action and representational relationship which holds because
of it. My suggestion is that the differences between the descriptions offered in each account
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is the same as the difference between descriptions A-D and A*-D* as described above.
Recall that A-D offered four descriptions of the action of the man at the pump whereas A*D* offered for descriptions of the very same action. These differing sets of descriptions,
A-D and A*-D*, should not be considered as inconsistent and competing accounts of the
action (indeed, we could imagine the man at the pump to agree to both). Instead, they are
accounts of the action which emphasize different points and offer a different perspective
on the very same action.
The same is true for the difference of descriptions offered by the DDI account and
the inferential account. They do not offer accounts of the action which are inconsistent with
one another; to accept the DDI’s means of understanding the representational use is not
thereby to deny the inferential conception’s accounting of the representational use (and
vice versa). Instead, both accounts offer unique perspectives and emphases about the nature
of the action.
Consequently, we can think of the differences between these accounts as making
salient certain elements of the practice of representation in science. Through the use of two
examples of representational uses of vehicles, I will discuss the differences in emphases in
greater detail below. But, as a first pass, we can say that Hughes’ DDI model of scientific
representation, while it is certainly interested in the whole practice of representation, is
focused most heavily upon the scientist’s actions qua manipulation of the vehicle. He
specifically describes the way in which results are demonstrated first and foremost to hold
of the vehicle, and then interpreted to hold of the target. Suárez’s inferential account seems
more interested in describing the greater purposes of the representation in making
inferences about the target system. His account focuses heavily on the inferences drawn

118

about the target system, drawing our attention to the role the inferences may play in
achieving the aims of the scientist. Whatever the case, it is important to note that the
difference in emphasis does not imply that the accounts are incompatible with each other.
The very same instance of representing can be described by each account. And, as I argued
above, we need not think that one set of descriptions is privileged over the others.
We should also note that the compatibility between the accounts does not imply
that they collapse into one another. The difference in salience in each account provides us
a different means of understanding the complex practice of representation in science—
some which may be more useful when explaining representation within particular domains
(e.g. in economics versus in chemistry), as it occurs with particular types of vehicles
(models versus equations versus diagrams, etc.), or for the sake of particular aims and goals
(e.g. explanation versus prediction). Indeed, it is for this very reason that my analysis
provides a positive argument in favor of the plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific
representation. The practice of representation in science is “a complex phenomenon” and
“a laborious art” (Knuuttila 2014, 304). Any single account, while it may offer an account
of the nature of the representational relationship present in virtue of the representing
actions, will not be able to sufficiently draw our attention to each of the elements of
representation and the various strategies which may be employed. It is for this reason that
the numerous accounts offer us a tapestry of explanation, through which we can better
understand representational practice (both in general and in particular case studies). There
is thus good reason to discussion and development of both of these accounts and of others
(new and old), since, jointly, they can better describe the complex practice of scientific
representation—across strategies, devices, and disciplines.
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4. Two Examples
To better understand the difference in emphases between the DDI Account and the
Inferential Account, it will be of use to consider a couple of examples in greater detail. I
will consider a scale-model and a mathematical equation with a fictional target. By
examining the analysis provided by each account in terms of the intentional action
descriptions, we will be able to notice the way in which the DDI Account focuses attention
on the use of the vehicle and the inferential account focuses our attention on the
achievement of epistemic aims in representation.
4.1 Mississippi River Basin Model
The Mississippi River Basin Model (MRBM) was a scale model of the Mississippi
river basin designed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Starting from its semicompletion in 1949, the MRBM was used by the Army Corps of Engineers to study the
effects of floods and proposed new flood management systems in the Mississippi River
Basin for nearly twenty years, most usefully predicting the effects of a flood on the
Missouri River (a major tributary of the Mississippi River) in 1952 (Foster 1971). The
model was used representationally in this case among many others. Engineers at the
MRBM used data collected by engineers in the field to simulate certain conditions of water
in-flow for the model which allowed the engineers to identify which levees were most
likely to break or be overtopped, and of these, which could be helped by adding sandbags,
and which were a lost cause (Foster 1971, 27). The model’s use was successful in
predicting the various flood stages that were seen at observation points along the Missouri
River, as well as in strengthening levees or evacuating populations at risk of flooding. In
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this one case, the MRBM was credited with avoiding nearly 65 million dollars of damage
(Foster 1971, 27).
Depending on which account of the nature of scientific representation you take, you
might offer different explanations of the representational nature of the MRBM in its use in
predicting levee damage in the 1952 Missouri River floods. Each of the accounts is
complementary: to accept the DDI Account of the representational use of the MRBM is
not to reject the Inferential Account. Each account can draw our attention more closely to
certain elements of the representational relationship.
Hughes’ DDI account offers an analysis in terms of denotation, demonstration, and
interpretation. In the first place, the DDI Account describes the denotational relationship
that exists in using the MRBM as a representation of the Mississippi River Basin. The
denotation is seen best in the way that the MRBM was designed so as to be useful as a
stand-in for flooding and the effects of flood control systems in the Mississippi River Basin.
As a map, it is only marginally useful, since its scale (1:100 vertical and 1:2000 horizontal)
made for a fairly distorted map (Mississippi Basin Model Board 1945). Thus, while the
MRBM allows individuals familiar with the river system to know what part of that system
some channel of the model represents, it is not useful as a means of measuring, say, the
distance between the Ohio river and the Missouri rivers. However, the scale (and many
other features of the model) were, in fact, designed to denote the flooding effects and stages
of the Mississippi river basin. Thus, scientists, in their testing associated with the Missouri
River flooding of 1952 began by taking the relevant portion of the model to stand-in for (a
small portion of) the Mississippi River Basin, with regard to its flooding and the effects of
the flooding.
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But this was not all they were doing, since it was important for them to be able to
make meaningful and useful predictions. Thus, they first needed to demonstrate results that
hold of the model. By using a complex set of instruments for both controlling water inflow
and measuring water height and outflow rates as a function of time, the engineers were able
to demonstrate that certain results held of the MRBM itself. That is, they showed that given
inflow rates of some value, this part of the MRBM became inundated, or this point of
outflow measurement measured at some new value. But, of course, since they take the
model as a stand-in of the Mississippi river basin, they do not stop there. The
demonstrations are taken to hold not only of the MRBM, but also to bear upon the flooding
in the Missouri River. To do so, engineers would have to understand the results (measured
in units of minutes and centimeters) as holding of the river basin (interpreted in units of
days and meters) (Foster 1971, 20–21). They had to notice what results held only of the
model. Engineers would communicate the meaningful results they gathered to engineers at
the field offices, who could apply them in the field to put them to use.
Using Hughes’ DDI account helps draw our attention to the way in which the model
was made as a stand-in as well as to the particular things which were performed on the
model itself. It draws our attention to the manipulability and the interactions with the
model, showing how an important element of representational practice is the manipulation
of a vehicle and the collection of results understood entirely in terms of the model itself.
Measurements at this point are made in terms of the model, with references to the model’s
grid system and model-type levels of water flow and channel height. But the
representational action is not complete at this stage. The scientist who stops here, with
demonstrations only in terms of the model has not represented. Thus, Hughes’ account
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also draws our attention to the way that the model results are interpreted and understood in
terms of the target system. In this case, that draws our attention to the use of scale and the
conversion that scientists make from model-type levels of water flow and channel height
to the predicted river-type levels of water flow and channel height.
The use of Suárez’s account of scientific representation to analyze the same case is
not in competition with the account offered by Hughes, though it does offer different
emphases. First, Suárez’s account describes the representational force of a representational
vehicle. The representational force exists when a competent scientist is led to consider a
target when using a source. The consideration here is similar to what was said about the
demonstration within the DDI Account, though Suárez is more explicit about the role of
the scientific community in the use of the MRBM as a stand-in. In particular, it matters that
the engineers using the model understand the way in which the model is useful and the
ways in which it is not useful. It matters not only that the model was designed to describe
flooding and flood-control systems of the Mississippi River Basin, but also that the
engineers using it are aware of this fact and are acting as members of the community. 26
Second, according to Suárez, it is important that surrogate inferences be drawn about the
target through the use of the model. In the case of the MRBM, we can see how it is that the
use of the model allows the engineers to draw inferences about the Mississippi River Basin,
and more specifically about flooding on the Missouri River. The predictions about flood
stages and knowledge of vulnerable levees came to the engineers not through a direct
examination of the river or theorization about the same, but through the use of the MRBM.

The importance of the community’s role in scientific representation is described in greater detail in (Boesch
2017).
26
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As before, Suárez’s account is not in competition with that of Hughes, though there
are a different set of emphases. Apart from drawing our attention more closely to the
communal element into the representational activities, Suárez’s account focuses on the
outcomes of the representational practice. His account draws our attention to the way in
which representational practice is productive: through the creation of knowledge,
predictions, and explanations. As such, Suárez’s account invites us to consider the way in
which aims are present in representational practice, not as an achievement after-the-fact of
representation, but as part of the activity of representing itself.
4.2 Hardy-Weinberg Equations
There are similar insights with other representational vehicles, even those which
have a fictional target. Consider, for example, the Hardy-Weinberg equations (Hardy
1908). The Hardy-Weinberg equations (p+q=1 and p2+2pq+q2=1) are used to describe the
change in allelic frequency of a population over time and were initially used to show that,
assuming random mating and a stable population, recessive alleles would not become
extinct over time. A population is described as being in a state of Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium provided that the allelic frequency of the population is static over consecutive
generations of a population. Importantly, there are a number of assumptions required to
reach a state of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Many of these assumptions are fairly
realistic: for example, that the organisms are diploidic, that organism reproduce only
sexually, that generations do not mate with one another, and that allele frequencies are
equal in the sexes. But a number of the underlying assumptions are less realistic, for
example, that mating is random, that there is no mutation, migration, or selection. One of
the assumptions is actually impossible: that the population is infinitely large. As such, the
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use of the equation to represent a population which is at a state of Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium will involve representing a population which could not possibly exist.
Let us reverse the order for this example and consider Suárez’s inferential account
of scientific representation first. His account will explain how a scientist’s use of the
Hardy-Weinberg equation will allow her to represent a population in a state of equilibrium
through reference to the two properties of activities. First, the scientist will take it that the
equations represent an infinitely large population of a diploidic, sexually reproducing
species (and so on). Importantly, the scientist will understand that it can represent such a
fictional target because she is an informed user. She is aware of a number of features of the
equation and its representational force that other, uninformed users would not know; for
example, that the assumptions reduce any opportunity for selection to occur. Second, the
scientist will use the equations to draw surrogate inferences about the target. In this case,
the scientist can show, by calculating the allelic frequency for each generation, that the
allelic frequency does not change. By violating certain assumptions, she can make
additional important and insightful inferences about the population which can inform the
theory of population genetics. For example, she can infer that the allelic frequency of the
infinite, non-migrating, diploid, sexually-reproducing, randomly-mating, etc. species will
not change over time. From this, she could—as Hardy originally aimed to show (1908,
49)—infer that, in the absence of selective pressures, the dominant allele will not take over.
To employ Hughes’ account of scientific representation, we must make a minor
(and friendly) amendment to his account, following a suggestion of Suárez (Suárez 2015a).
Hughes’ use of the concept of denotation suggests that representation can occur only when
a target actually exists. Given the fact that scientists often represent fictional targets, it is
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important to modify his account to allow for such uses. Suárez suggests that instead of a
discussion of denotation, Hughes should have made reference to the “denotative function”
of a representational vehicle. A vehicle has denotative function when it is the sort of object
which would denote its target, provided the target actually exists. I take it that this is a
friendly amendment to Hughes’ account, given the pragmatic nature of his explanation of
scientific representation.
With this small change in mind, let us consider the representational use of the
Hardy-Weinberg equations according to Hughes’ account. First, there is the denotative
function, in which a scientist allows the equations to stand in for the fictional population.
Second, there is demonstration in which the scientist shows certain features that hold of
the equation (e.g., that the frequency of p is stable over multiple iterations of the equation).
Here, the manipulation of the equation is done entirely in terms of the equation,
demonstrating particular results and insights that hold of the equation itself. Finally, the
scientist interprets these demonstrated results to hold of the fictional population as well,
showing that the allelic frequency of the population would hold steady as well.
Similar to the example of the MBRM, Suárez’s account draws our attention more
heavily to the role of the knowledge of the representing scientist (in terms of being
informed) as well as the aims and goals of the representing scientist, by pointing us to the
specific inferences she is drawing. In this case, it allowed us to see the representational
uses in explaining that the dominant allele would not increase in frequency in the absence
of selective pressures. Indeed, Suárez’s account can be useful in drawing our attention to
the way in which a vehicle is constructed for the achievement of particular aims.
Representational practice is all ordered towards these aims and ends, and the inferential
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account is useful in making this fact salient across a wide range of examples. As was the
case with the MRBM, the DDI account draws our attention more closely to the means of
the representational use, to the way in which the equation itself is used, manipulated, and
modified, before conclusions are drawn about the target system. We are made to consider
the successive iterations of the equation that the scientist might write down, one after the
other, to show the stability in the numbers of p and q. Suárez’s inferential account makes
such an element less explicit, by drawing our attention more quickly to the aims and end
results. Hughes’ account makes salient the nitty-gritty work associated with the use of the
model itself. The role of interpretation also points to another important element of
representational practice in science, that of translating between the vehicle and its target.
Hughes does not describe the nature of the translation that occurs, but does draw our
attention to the importance of such a translation, which is itself the focus of other pragmatic
accounts of representation (as I describe in greater detail below).
4.3 Other Accounts
It is important to note that the insights mentioned here are not restricted to a
comparison between Suárez’s and Hughes’ accounts. All pragmatic accounts are subject
to the same sort of analysis as I have offered and described for these two accounts, in which
the features they identify are a set of descriptions of the representing actions and the
representational relationship they undergird. Similarly, each of the accounts will
demonstrate additional benefits in terms of emphases when explaining particular
representational uses. Where Suárez’s account draws our attention to the the communal
nature of the representational relationship as well as the aims and goals of the representing
and Hughes’ account draws our attention to the manipulation and interaction with the
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vehicle and points to the role for translation, other accounts will draw our attention more
closely to other features.
Giere’s (2004, 2010) account offers a means of better understanding the translation
between vehicle and target which Hughes’ account makes salient. Giere’s Agent-Based
Similarity Account suggests that representation in science is a four-place relationship in
which some “Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world,
W; (4) for some purpose, P” (2010, 274). He goes on to suggest that similarity is “one way,
perhaps the most important way, but probably not the only way” that scientists use a model
to represent the world—it is a feature exploited by scientists in translating from vehicle to
the world. So, for example, a scientist using the Lotka-Volterra model will exploit the
similarities that hold between the change in values of variables to the change in values of
the population of foxes and rabbits. The Army Corps of Engineers used similarities in flowrates, channel height, and outflow between the MRBM and flooding on the Mississippi
River basin to be able to translate between the results demonstrated on the vehicle and
those which would hold of the river basin itself.
Similar attention to the translation between vehicle and target is found in van
Fraassen’s (2008) account which acknowledges the irreducible role for the agent in the
representational relationship, but suggests that “a model can (be used to) represent a given
phenomenon accurately only if it has a substructure isomorphic to that phenomenon”
(2008, 309). Van Fraassen’s account thus draws our attention the relationship that holds
between structures and substructures of a vehicle and a target, offering a different means
of understanding the translation between vehicle and target.
5. Conclusion
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There are a myriad of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, each of
which, I have argued, contributes to our understanding of the wide-reaching and complex
practice of representation in science. By drawing our attention to different features by
providing alternative emphases, the accounts offer a tapestry of explanations. Further
studies of this sort may reveal that certain accounts are more useful for an understanding
of the representational practices found in some particular discipline or subdiscipline,
associated with the use of particular types of vehicles, or performed for the sake of
particular aims and goals. Whatever the case, it is clear that the plurality of pragmatic
accounts is to be valued, not because each is partially correct, but rather because each is a
unique perspective by which we can understand the wide, varied, and complex practice of
representation in science.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: SCIENCE IS REPLETE WITH HUMAN ACTIONS
1. Four Approaches to Representation
One of the ways of explaining the value of my dissertation is to show how the
perspective of locating scientific representation at the level of human action is distinct from
other means of exploring scientific representation. Apart from the pragmatic approach,
which I have deepened and further developed in my dissertation, there are three other
prominent means of explaining the nature of scientific representation—the substantivist,
internalist, and sociological accounts. The first of these, substantivist accounts of
representation (similarity and (partial) isomorphism), approaches representation as if it
were a relationship “out there” in the world. It appeals to a more fundamental relationship
which is supposed to exist between features of the representational vehicle and features of
its target.
On the other hand is the view proposed by internalists (e.g., Callender and Cohen
2006) which places the representational relationship entirely inside the minds of scientists.
According to the internalist picture of scientific representation, we cannot explain the
representational relationship in terms of the features holding of objects of the world, but
rather in terms of the representational nature of our internal mental states. Representation,
wherever it is utilized, turns out to be a relationship which is explained with reference to
our minds and mental capacities, rather than a relationship which is explained by features
in the world (as the substantivist perspective suggests).
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A third approach, advocated by some sociologists of science (e.g., Lynch and
Woolgar 1990), argues that representation is a feature of scientific practice. In order to
understand representation in science, they argue, we must understand a wide range of
heterogenous activities which are called representation. However, these sociologists of
science argue that there is no “originary reality” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8) to be
represented. As such, there is no real ‘representation’ in science, but rather a set of activities
by which scientists construct and abstract away from their targets. Sociologists of science
present what Giere called a “no representation account of representation” (1994, 115).
The fourth approach to the problem of representation is that offered by pragmatic
accounts of scientific representation. As I have advanced and defended the pragmatic
approach in this dissertation, it has both points of agreement and of significant departure
from each of the three alternative approaches to the nature of representation in science.
While I deny the substantivist’s claim that representation in science can be reduced
to features of representational vehicles and their relationship to the world, I agree with the
substantivist that representational use relies heavily upon the features which are built into
representational vehicles. In chapter four, I argued that an investigation of representational
means (like similarity and isomorphism) is one of the ways we can come to a better
understanding of scientific practice. Indeed, the construction or development of similarity
and isomorphism in any given representational vehicle would constitute a significant
element of what I describe in chapter two as the representational licensing of the vehicle.
I agree also with the internalists (and with the pragmatists) that there is an
irreducible role for the scientist in understanding the nature of scientific representation. My
understanding of scientific representation defended in this dissertation requires that there
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be individual, intelligent agents who perform scientific, representational actions. However,
the internalist goes wrong by missing the broader role of scientific practice in these actions,
as I argued in chapters three and four. Representation is not a feature that holds in virtue
of a scientist’s mental states, but rather in virtue of her practical rationality: her actions
performed in the context of the broader scientific community.
With the sociologist of science, I acknowledge the central place and value of the
scientific community in understanding representational practice in science. However,
despite its complexity, I maintain that there is a real relationship of representation in
science. To accommodate the complexity of scientific representation, we must
acknowledge the wide range of means and ends which are involved in representational
actions in science (as I described in chapter four).
The pragmatic approach to scientific representation, as I have developed and
defended it here, suggest that the relationship of representation is not located ‘out there’ in
the world, nor is it located in the minds of agents, and neither is it a mere family
resemblance of distinct activities. Instead, the relationship of representation in science is
located at the level of human actions performed in accord with a practice. As Suárez has
put it: scientific representation is located “‘in the world’, and more particularly in the social
world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by those communities of
inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99). Over the
course of the chapters of my dissertation, I have further developed this idea—describing
the role of the community in scientific representation (in chapter three), offering an account
of scientific, representational actions (in chapter four), and explaining the history of and
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continued relevance of pragmatic approaches to scientific representation (in chapters two
and three).
2. Value for Future Work
Apart from deepening and developing the pragmatic approach to the nature of
scientific representation, there is additional value to my dissertation project in that it will
serve as a groundwork for additional fruitful projects. There are three general types of
future project which I see flowing directly from the work I have begun and developed in
this dissertation.
The first main area of further research will continue to explore and investigate
scientific representation through the lens of action theory in the way that I have initiated in
this dissertation. One project that has strong promise is a further development of the
concept of representational licensing, which I first introduced in chapter three. As a
reminder, in that chapter I argued that an irreducible component of the representational
relationship is the way in which it is licensed as a representation by the broader scientific
community. While I provided a brief analysis of the concept and demonstrated its
importance in reference to the development of the Lotka-Volterra model, there is more
work to be done in better elucidating the concept and showing its relevance to
representation in other contexts. As such, one potential project coming out of this
dissertation is the further exploration and elucidation of the notion of representational
licensing, both theoretically (providing a deeper analysis of the notion of licensing) and
practically (using case studies to show how licensing functions within scientific practice).
One of the features that makes my dissertation project novel is the way in which it
connects two literatures which are otherwise fairly unconnected: philosophy of science and
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philosophy of action. The connection, as explored and utilized in this dissertation, has been
unidirectional—using the insights from action theory to better elucidate and understand
concepts in philosophy of science. I think there are also important and interesting studies
which could be made by reversing this strategy, that is, by using work in the philosophy of
science to better understand important concepts within the philosophy of action. As just
one example, the literature within the philosophy of action on the topic of know-how and
skills tends to focus on simple examples, e.g., riding a bike, skiing, playing piano, and
playing chess. These may be helpful examples for initial forays into the concepts, but they
lack much of the complexity which is often associated with many real-world skills which
involve dynamic aims, complex sociological and practice-oriented interactions, and interskill interactions. If we are going to develop a concept of skill which is useful in more
complex studies—e.g., in education or virtue ethics—we will need to rely on more complex
examples, which mimic the complexity found in learning and in living a virtuous life. As
such, the complexity of skills as they function within scientific practice might form a solid
basis on which to form, develop, and test an account of skills
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